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On Interviews

A. A. A. Fyzee

Interviewing

THE interview as a mode of selection by Public Service Commissions is the object of attack and disparagement by almost every one, except perhaps by a recently successful candidate. How is it possible to judge of a man's ability and character for public service within the space of ten or fifteen minutes? The proposition put in these terms is certainly difficult to sustain, but one may respectfully suggest that it is nothing more than a half-truth. A famous judge has said that a half-truth is more dangerous than a lie. That may not apply in this instance, but it is well to remember, first, that the interview is undertaken by experienced persons, who are proficient in the art and science of judging, who are known for their independence and integrity, and who are by no means so vain as to think that their judgements are infallible. Secondly, only a very small percentage of interviews last for ten to fifteen minutes; the majority are between 20 and 30 minutes, and finally, the interview is only an additional means of judgement. There is the written record of the man's career and it is to supplement this that the interview takes place. In other words, the interview begins where the dossier ends. Similarly, in certain cases where there is an examination, but the man has had no experience of service, the interview is another test applied for discovering his relative fitness. The method of selecting personnel by interview is adopted not only by Public Service Commissions in India but also by a number of other Government agencies and private firms.

II

What really is an interview? It is a purposeful and

well-directed conversation on topics of choice, and is an attempt to bring out the experience, the skill and the intelligence of the candidate. While the general principles of an interview are the same, each particular post or selection has its own special considerations and special criteria of choice. But generally speaking, it may be said that three matters are uppermost in the mind of the interviewer. First, technical skill; second, general experience in the field; and third, the intelligence and initiative of the candidate.

Two or three illustrations will, perhaps, make the method of the interview clear. Suppose we want to select a doctor, or an engineer, or an administrator. While the general approach will be the same, we will have to ask ourselves what kind of a doctor or engineer or administrator it is that we want. In the case of a doctor we shall require certain academic qualifications. They will be found in the dossier. But if we want a surgeon or an anaesthetist or a specialist in children's diseases, we shall have to ask him what his experience is in these particular fields and at the end of half an hour or so, we should certainly be able to supplement the written record in such a manner that the candidate's skill and experience become real to us.

In the case of an engineer similar principles of choice apply. We shall want to know what kind of training he has had; what kind of buildings he has built; what are his special interests; whether he is still interested in the use of scientific methods for solving important problems and whether he has surmounted practical difficulties which lie in the path of all engineers.

In the case of a general administrator slightly different questions assume importance. We shall want to know whether he is a man of clear thinking and is capable of setting his hand to a wide variety of jobs which he may be called upon to perform in later life, and for this purpose, general knowledge and general awareness of things is of the greatest importance. What is needed is commonsense and the capacity for quick decision rather than great erudition or brilliancy of imagination. Here is a good picture of the ideal administrator :

"...Your great administrator above all has judgement, personality and commonsense; judgement that makes

his decisions right more often than they are wrong; commonsense that gives him a solid grasp of essentials and takes him to the heart of a problem; personality of a calibre and a force that carries people with him, exacts discipline with the rarest recourse to overt power, and enables him to wring success even out of a wrong decision. He is intelligent but with a full share of earthiness. He thrives on the gross air of every day affairs. He has the common touch. He likes people. He has a zest for life. Essentially, he is a well-rounded, well-balanced man, broadbacked, with a certain simplicity of nature and the sense of proportion that goes with a sense of humour. So far from shrinking from difficulties, he finds life savourless without them. Problems attract him like mountains do the born climber—he itches to get at them. He may have ambition—this adds driving force—but it is no substitute for the zest for life and human contact. He may have, indeed he must have, considerable gifts of intellect, but he is not intellectually aloof. In short, he is a man to whom management is one of the supreme arts of living. There then, is the sort of man we are looking for. Or, rather, we are looking for the sort of youngster who, with right handling, great care and often great patience, will turn out sometime in his thirties or forties to be that sort of man.....”*

The particular solutions offered by the candidate are of comparatively lesser importance than his attitude and capacity to think out things. To take an illustration, we may ask the candidate about the policy of prohibition or the use of Hindi as the official language of India. There is room for great divergence of opinion on these questions. But what is of importance is the manner in which the young man marshals his facts and produces them and brings you to the solution which is in his mind. It reminds us of what used to be said regarding the training in the Universities in England—it does not matter *what* you read, but it does matter *how* you read it. The solution offered by the candidate is of comparatively minor importance; what matters is the method by which he offers the solution.

* Twenty-fourth Report of the Commonwealth Public Services, Public Service Board, Commonwealth of Australia, 1948, pp. 5-6.

III

Lawyers are accustomed to say that a cross-examiner is born and not made; that no one can teach the art of cross-examination and that all that can be done is to learn from the example of a great practitioner. There is a great deal in common between a cross-examination and an interview. Both are designed to find out the truth of the matter; but, while in a cross-examination you may be opposed by a clever and unscrupulous witness who does not wish to tell you the truth, in an interview you have a young man who almost always desires to display his wares to the best possible advantage. In other words, the witness in a cross-examination tries to conceal an important fact, while a candidate in an interview attempts to give the best account of his qualifications and experience and almost wishes to tell you even more than you desire. It cannot be denied that a cross-examination is far more difficult than an interview, but experience shows that the art of interviewing a candidate is a difficult one; some of the pitfalls can be avoided, but a really good interviewer is not common.

An easy candidate is a person who falls in with the spirit of the interview and begins to talk in a natural and unaffected manner. He is not afraid and he knows his subject tolerably well. The difficult candidate is a man who suspects the Interview Board, or swaggers and boasts, or talks too much and gets confused, and mixes up truth with imagination. The present writer has found the greatest difficulty in interviewing a candidate who suspects the *bona fides* of the Selection Board. He knows but will not speak freely. He tells a number of things but keeps back much more. Another difficult case is of a man who is ill or nervous and cannot do justice to himself. It is impossible to give him a second chance and one feels helpless that nothing better can be done.

There are various kinds of candidates whom the Selection Board has to encounter. The best of them are those who try to speak naturally on matters which are well within their own personal knowledge. Some, however, try to ride the high horse, and some try to bluff and to carry conviction by endeavouring to claim omniscience. This is rather a dangerous procedure because the likelihood is that the bubble can be pricked by some member of the Board or the other. A

familiar case is this. Quite a number of candidates, on being asked about their general reading, mention the novels of Bernard Shaw. Now, apart from any other considerations, the possibility that at least one member might have read some of the works of Shaw, including the plays, must surely be considered by the candidate.

A certain amount of preparation, both emotional as well as factual, is necessary if a candidate wishes to make a good impression. Apart from general knowledge, which he should naturally possess, he must brush up the main elements of the subject which he has studied, particularly in relation to the job he seeks. Supposing a man applies for the post of a civil engineer. He must surely sit back and think as to what are the normal questions relating to his job which may crop up before a Selection Board. We often have candidates who apply for a job for which they are well-fitted but have never given a thought to this question. The brief encounter with the interviewers then becomes an unnecessary trial, when it might otherwise have been a pleasant conversation.

IV

To produce a friendly atmosphere, and not to reduce the interview to the level of a cross-examination or a *viva voce* test, should be the aim of all interviews; quite often one talks too much and does not allow the candidate to speak. Sometimes one is in a sarcastic mood and one is tempted to give a devastating reply to a poor candidate who thereupon flops completely by reason of nervousness. To preserve a natural flow of conversation in the artificial atmosphere of a Board Room is not easy. The candidate knows that experienced officers are watching him; he is utterly at a disadvantage, and it is this feeling of nervousness and strain which must be removed so that he can speak naturally and tell the Selection Board what he knows and confess freely what he does not. To achieve this is not easy. But it can be done and is achieved in the great majority of cases.

In interviewing candidates a certain number of questions arise in one's mind and some of these have been formulated as follows :

- “(a) What is the standard of the candidate's mental ability? Does he think logically and efficiently?

Can he think for himself? Can he get quickly to the heart of a matter and see the principles involved? Can he generalize correctly? Is he good at seeing the implications of points made? Can he acquire a sound background of knowledge and use it successfully?

- (b) Is he business-like? Is he interested in the practical details of a scheme as well as in the broad principles? Can he think out the general lines on which a practical task should be organized and take into account the quantitative factors involved? Can he take decisions and stand by them?
- (c) Has he shown himself to be constructive and imaginative or does he merely reproduce?
- (d) Can he express himself clearly and cogently both in speech and writing?
- (e) Is he mentally honest? Does he appear to be a man of complete integrity? Has he the courage of his convictions?
- (f) Has he been interested in his surroundings and in the people he has met? Does he get on well with his equals, his subordinates and those in authority? Do people like him and continue to like him? Is he, for his age and position, a person of some weight and maturity, a man whose judgement is respected? Has he shown some interest in managing affairs (e.g., at school, at the university, in the Forces), and has he been successful in them?
- (g) Does his record suggest vitality and stamina? Does he show a proper zest and enthusiasm?
- (h) Is he mentally adaptable and flexible, or is his mind rigid and impervious to new ideas?
- (i) Is he a man with some continuity of purpose? Has he thought responsibly about the work for which he is applying? Is he likely to develop an interest in public business and in the particular work of his department? Will he be loyal to

his chiefs and to their policy ? Is his ambition reasonably attuned to the requirements of the public service ?” *

V

Last of all, a great responsibility rests on the Chairman of a Board of interview. He must ensure that the candidate is interrogated in a proper spirit; that a friendly atmosphere is created; that difficult questions are avoided; that no one should even unknowingly “kill” a candidate. Sometimes a problem, to which a wrong answer is given by the candidate, is pursued with such vehemence and in such tortuous detail, that the candidate writhes like a witness under the fire of cross-examination. The atmosphere of the court-room or of a University *viva voce* examination is a thing to be avoided like poison.

And yet, the questioning must be well-directed, with a set purpose. One comes across distinguished experts who ask one or two elementary questions in a haphazard manner, and when the candidate fails to answer, they conclude that the man is worthless. This mistake can be avoided by the Chairman of the Board intervening and putting the candidate at ease by a light remark or by asking a question of a different character. Above all, each expert must be encouraged to speak to the candidate on his own subject, so that the final judgement is based on the pooled resources of the mind and experience of each member of the Selection Board.

An admirable thing would be to take a sound movie of an actual interview, extending over half an hour, and show it to the public without comment. Such a spectacle would assuredly go far towards allaying public anxiety regarding the horrors of the Public Service Commission interview.



* Memorandum by the Civil Service Commissioners on the use of the Civil Service Selection Board in the Reconstruction Competitions, London, 1951, para 33, p. 9.

Parliamentary Control Over Delegated Legislation in India

M. P. Sharma

DELEGATED legislation has been defined as the exercise of minor legislative power by subordinate authorities and bodies in pursuance of the statutory authority given by Parliament itself*. Such authority is granted usually to the Government (ministers or ministries) or to statutory corporations like the Universities, local bodies and others. It is almost never given to single officers of lower rank. The output of delegated legislation is variously called 'regulations', 'orders', 'by-laws', 'minutes', 'schemes', etc. These are strictly subordinate to the terms and conditions of the delegation laid down in the enabling Act, and are liable to be declared void by the courts if they go beyond or against these terms. Hence delegated legislation is also called subordinate legislation. Although powers of delegated legislation are, in most cases, exercised by the executive, yet it must not be confused with the original legislative power vested in the executive such as the ordinance-making power of the President of India.

Usually delegated legislation is concerned with minor matters of detail, though not always. There are instances both in the foreign countries and in India, where important powers, such as the power to determine matters of principle, to impose taxation, to amend acts of Parliament, to create new offences, and to lay down penalties have been delegated. These are regarded as abnormal or exceptional instances of delegation but they are by no means rare. Also, from the citizen's point of view, the rules made in pursuance of delegated power are often more important than the general clauses of the parent statute because these rules prescribe his rights and obligations in a concrete manner and outline the procedure to be followed by him in particular matters.

* The Committee on Ministers' Powers, Report (Cmd. 4060), London, H.M.S.O., 1932, p. 4.

Shri G. V. Mavalankar, the late Speaker of the Lok Sabha, once remarked that delegated legislation is both a Necessity and a risk. It is a necessity because Parliament has not got the necessary time or expert knowledge to deal with the details of modern legislation. It is also a risk because Parliament, in the hurry of the moment, may delegate what it should, properly speaking, keep in its own hands and because, in exercising the delegated power, departmental experts may go beyond or against the terms of delegation, or even when they do not do so, make the rules with an eye, more to administrative convenience than to the convenience of the people. Left to itself, delegated legislation may thus encroach on the sphere of Parliament as well as on the liberties of the people.

Hence, control of delegated legislation is a matter of vital importance and safeguards must be provided to minimise the risk involved. The safeguards usually take the form of defining the limits of delegation, laying down a special procedure for rule-making, giving adequate publicity to the proposed rules, requiring the rules made to be "laid before" the legislature for a prescribed period, and the provision of control and review by the courts.

It is proposed to discuss here mainly only one of these safeguards, namely, Parliamentary control over delegated legislation with special reference to India. It is more important than any other safeguard taken singly, because it checks mischief at the very source and saves the citizen the trouble of seeking a remedy against obnoxious rules on his own account. It is also new to our country.

II

Although delegated legislation in India is more than a century old and certain safeguards in limited form, such as the publication of the rules and judicial review have existed from the very beginning, there existed no arrangements, until recently, for the scrutiny or control of delegated legislation by the legislature itself. This was only natural, as the Government of the country was not responsible to the legislature and the considerations of popular liberty were subordinated to the exigencies of administration. Until the thirties, the rules were not even laid before the legislature for information.

The first real step in the direction of Parliamentary scrutiny and control of delegated legislation was taken on

December 1, 1953, when the Speaker of the House of the People appointed under Rule 88 of the Rules of Procedure a 'Committee on Subordinate Legislation'. It consisted of 15 members including the Chairman, Shri H. V. Pataskar, now the Union Minister for Legal Affairs. The function of the Committee was to scrutinize the rules and regulations made in pursuance of the authority delegated by Parliament and to draw the attention of that body to any objectionable points or deficiencies. So far the Committee has published four reports. These reports throw a good deal of light on the problems and progress of Parliamentary control over delegated legislation in India.

The work of the Committee can conveniently be reviewed under three main heads, namely :

- (i) Evolution of a uniform pattern of the terms of delegation contained in the enabling statutes, particularly in regard to the laying of the rules before Parliament and the right of the latter to modify them.
- (ii) Improvement in the publicity to the rules made and of the language employed so as to make it easily intelligible to the people.
- (iii) Scrutiny of the rules hitherto made so as to develop a sort of jurisprudence of delegated legislation—and a guide to what is good and sufficient and what could be considered objectionable.

III

With a view to securing the maximum possible measure of uniformity in the terms of delegation and rule-making procedure, the Committee on Subordinate Legislation made the following two recommendations at its second sitting held on March 12, 1954 :

- (1) That bills containing proposals for delegation of legislative power should invariably be accompanied by memoranda explaining the scope and the details of such proposals.
- (2) That the provisions delegating legislative powers in the various statutes should be of a uniform pattern.

As regards the first point, the Committee desired that the memorandum accompanying the bill should give the full purport and effect of the delegation of power to subordinate authorities, the points to be covered by the rules, and the particulars of the subordinate authorities which were to exercise the delegated power. That would, it was felt, enable the Parliament to ensure that the legislative power delegated was not of an exceptional or abnormal type and was delegated only to trustworthy authorities. It was only after some perseverance and struggle that the Committee could persuade the departments promoting bills to append to them the required memoranda. The first bill accompanied by a memorandum of delegation was the Transfer of Evacuee Deposits Bill, 1954. The latter read : "The scope of clause 13 is limited to *routine* matters which may arise in the implementation of this law, and the rule-making power is of a normal character"* . This laconic form of memorandum did not satisfy the Committee. Later memoranda have been fuller and more informative.

As regards the second point, the Committee noted that the existing Acts contained four types of delegating provisions, namely :

- (i) Where the Government can make and promulgate the rules without any further formality.
- (ii) Where the Government can make and promulgate the rules but are also required to lay them before Parliament after publication.
- (iii) Where the rules made and laid before Parliament for a specified period are made subject to modification, if any, by Parliament.
- (iv) Where the draft rules have to be laid before Parliament for a specified period *before publication* and made subject to modification, if any, by Parliament.

The majority of the delegating provisions are of type (i), *i.e.* mere notification of the rules in the Gazette was all that was required. Examples of type (ii), *i.e.* simple laying of the rules before Parliament without any provision for modification, are found in the Coal Mines Act, 1952 (Section 17)

* Committee on Subordinate Legislation, First Report, New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1954, pp. 2-3.

and the Salaries and Allowances of Officers of Parliament Act, 1953 (Section 11). Some important instances of type (iii), *i.e.* laying the rules before Parliament and their possible modification by the latter, are the Insurance Act, 1938 (Section 114), the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Section 133) and the Reserve and the Auxiliary Air Force Act, 1952 (Section 34). A typical example of (iv), *i.e.* laying the rules before Parliament for a specific period before their final publication, is the Estate Duty Act, 1953 (Section 20). Besides these, there is a fifth type wherein the approval of the rules by an affirmative resolution of Parliament is required; for instance, under the Indian Tariff Act, 1934, notifications announcing increases in the export duty have not only to be laid before Parliament but must also be specifically approved by it within a prescribed period.

In order to achieve uniformity in the procedure in regard to rule-making, the Committee on Subordinate Legislation recommended that the following four principles* should be observed in future :

- (i) All the Acts making delegation of the legislative power should uniformly require the rules made under them to be laid on the table of the Houses as soon as possible but not later than 7 days after their publication in the Gazette.
- (ii) The laying of the rules on the table of the Houses should in all cases be for a uniform, total period of 30 days.
- (iii) The enabling Acts should always provide expressly that the rules made under them shall be subject to modification by Parliament.
- (iv) In exceptional cases provision may be made for laying of the rules and regulations on the table of the House 30 days before the rules come into operation.

Actual observance of the four principles mentioned above has not been easy to secure. The Committee had to repeatedly point out that in spite of their recommendation, many of the bills introduced and pending, contained no provision for the laying of the rules made under them on the

* Ibid, pp. 18-19.

table of the Houses of Parliament. Notable among these were the Government Premises (Eviction) Amendment Bill, 1954, the Territorial Army Bill, 1954, Auxiliary Territorial Force Bill, 1954, Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Bill, 1954, the Spirituous Preparations Control Bill, 1955, the Manipur State Hill People's Regulation Bill, 1954, and the University Grants Commission Bill, 1954. Similarly, many of the bills contained no express provision for the modification of the rules, made under them, by Parliament. Finally, even where laying of the rules on the table of the Houses was required, there was inordinate delay in some cases in doing so. Faced with such a situation, the Committee came to the conclusion that, whether or not any rule was required to be laid before the House, it was desirable for the Committee to scrutinise the whole range of subordinate legislation. It also took the view that the Parliament had an inherent right to modify any rules laid on its table whether the enabling Acts contained an express provision to that effect or not*.

IV

The Committee next took up the questions of proper publicity of the rules and of the improvement of their language. Publicity of the rules is considered to be a vital part of the rule-making procedure. Both in the U.K. and the U.S.A., there is statutory provision for it. In the U.K. the Rules Publication Act, 1893, requires prior notice of the draft rules to be given for purposes of inviting criticisms and suggestions. In the U.S.A. the Federal Register Act, 1935, provides for the publication, in the Federal Register, of all the rules of 'general applicability and legal effect' while publicity is provided for by the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946. The process of popular consultation is carried much farther in the U.S.A. than in the U.K. by requiring open public hearings in case of the more important rules. In India, while the British practice is generally followed there is no statutory provision on the matter and neither any systematic procedure or machinery for publicity and consultation. An enquiry by the Committee on Subordinate Legislation from the Ministry of Law on the subject revealed that the statutory rules and orders made by that Ministry are generally published in the Gazette of India and copies thereof are sent to the State

* Ibid, First Report, 1954, p. 18 (para 10); Third Report, 1955, p. 8 (para 40).

Governments, who in their discretion translate and give publicity to them for the use of the public. The Law Ministry had, however, no ready information about the practice of the other Ministries.* The Committee accordingly made the following suggestions :

- (i) The Government should examine every set of rules to assess whether or not it is of concern or importance to the general public.
- (ii) Advance copies of the rules of importance to the general public should be sent to the State Governments which should publish them in their own Gazettes and also arrange for translation in the languages of the States. There should be a simultaneous publication of the rules at the Centre and in the States.
- (iii) Government should issue press communiques to give publicity to the general purport and effect of the rules and orders.

The Committee further found that the language of the rules in some cases is difficult for the public to understand, e.g., S.R.O. 491 of 1954, re. Estate Duty (Controlled Companies) Rules. The explanation of the Central Board of Revenue in this case was that they had copied the language verbatim for the U.K. Rules. Naturally enough the Committee was not satisfied with the explanation and drew pointed attention to the observations of a former Lord Chancellor of the U.K. about such rules : 'that they are of unrivalled complexity and difficulty and couched in language so tortuous that I am tempted to reject them as meaningless'. The Committee also recommended that explanatory notes, which should not form part of the rules, should be appended to all rules in order to explain their general purport.

V

Finally, the Committee has scrutinized quite a considerable number of rules hitherto made under the various Acts, and suggested modification and improvements. It has generally demanded modification where the rules :

- (a) sought to introduce a substantive provision of law pertaining to the jurisdiction of the courts [e.g.,

* Ibid, 3rd Report, pp .8-9.

Rule 6A of the Cinematograph (Censorship) Rules, 1951] ;

- (b) lacked in specificity and definiteness, *e.g.*, the Development Councils (Procedural) Rules, 1952 which provided for alternative methods of appointment of chairmen of bodies created under the rules;
- (c) affected the salaries and allowances of the ministers of the Government, action by Parliament being considered necessary to avoid uninformed public criticism;
- (d) were liable to cause injustice, *e.g.*, Rule 147 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, under which goods in the custody of the Government warehouses would be liable to duty even if they had been lost by theft from the warehouses;
- (e) contravened the provisions of the parent Act;
- (f) dealt with matters which should more appropriately be dealt with by an Act of Parliament, *e.g.*, imposition or variation of taxation under Rules 2(2), 2(7), 5, 7, 9, 11 and 15 of the Estate Duty (Controlled Companies) Rules, 1953;
- (g) were couched in complicated language, unintelligible to the people; and
- (h) omitted matters of vital importance, *e.g.*, the Tea Rules, 1953 which did not lay down the conditions of service of the secretary and other officers of the Tea Board.

The Committee is thus gradually developing a jurisprudence of delegated legislation in India.

It will appear from the foregoing account that there is a continuing and urgent need for the Parliamentary scrutiny of delegated legislation in our country. The work so far done in this connection by the parliamentary Committee on Subordinate Legislation is impressive, and the promise for the future is bright. It is time that such committees were set up at the state level also, to scrutinize the delegated legislation in the several states.

A word of caution here is, however, necessary. For the successful performance of their onerous duties, the committees will require zeal as well as restraint. As Shri G.V. Mavalankar,

the late Speaker of the Lok Sabha, said in the course of his address to the Committee: 'The usefulness of the committee and its prestige can be established only as the time goes on and as the committee functions dispassionately with *a judicial mind and moderation on non-party lines.*' Thus, the Committee had to consider whether a uniform pattern of terms of delegation in all cases was practicable or desirable. To take only one instance, originally the Committee desired that all the rules must be laid on the table of Parliament for a period of 30 days before they were finally published and came into force. Later, it had to modify this requirement in face of the difficulty experienced in cases where the rules had to be implemented immediately on their being made public. A uniform method of laying the rules before Parliament would prove cumbersome and also unnecessary in case of the less important rules. It has to be remembered that in the U.K. there are no fewer than five different patterns of laying of the rules on the table of the House(s), viz. (i) simple laying with no other requirement, (ii) laying with the requirements of approval by one or both the Houses of Parliament by an affirmative resolution before the rules can become operative, (iii) laying subject to annulment of rules by a hostile resolution of either House within a specified period, (iv) laying in draft form for a prescribed number of days, and (v) laying in draft form subject to the condition that the rules do not operate till approved. The requirement in regard to the laying of the rules has necessarily to be related to the nature and importance of the rules. No attempt should, therefore, be made to prescribe too rigid a procedure.

Again, while the right of the Committee to examine the entire range of delegated legislation, whether laid on the table or not, and the right of Parliament to modify all the rules laid before it, whether there is express provision for modification or not, remain undoubted, the question is not so much of right or power as of practicability. The Committee might find itself overwhelmed if it took to examining every rule and order made. It should, therefore, call upon Government to assist it in its task by drawing its attention to those enabling Acts and rules which present exceptional features. The Committee and the Parliament may also consider whether the rules laid on the table should be actually modified by Parliament or simply rejected when there is anything objectionable in them. The British Parliament does not modify the rules

laid before it*. In most cases they are laid merely for information or possible challenge. Where the Committee on Statutory Instruments** (established in 1944) points out any abnormalities or defects in the rules, the Parliament simply rejects them and the executive has to present a fresh draft free from the defects objected to. It is not that British Parliament (which is a sovereign body) has not the power to modify ; it is because if it took to modifying the rules, the whole point of delegated legislation—saving the time of Parliament—would be lost.

VI

‘Judicial review’ of delegated legislation, a safeguard next in importance only to Parliamentary scrutiny, is outside the scope of the present article. The courts in India, like their British counterparts, have always had the power to examine the validity of the rules, unless their jurisdiction is expressly excluded in a given case or class of cases. The position remains unchanged. There are quite a large number of Acts in India which seek to restrict or exclude judicial review. An instance in point is the assessment of income and similar other taxes. It is a question of some constitutional importance whether our legislatures, central and state, under the new constitutional set-up can exclude by their Acts the jurisdiction of the courts from any matter, when those Acts themselves are liable to judicial review unless expressly exempted by the provisions of the Constitution of India. The Indian Parliament is not as fully sovereign as the British Parliament. In a federal country like ours the analogy of the U.S.A. is more applicable, and in that country judicial review cannot be excluded from any matter by the Acts of the Congress or State legislatures. It would therefore seem that any Act in India which seeks to exclude judicial review directly or indirectly from the rules and orders made under them, unless, of course, expressly protected by the Constitution, is now unconstitutional. It would be illuminating if the contributors and the readers of this *Journal* throw some light on the matter.

* Herbert Morrison : ‘Government and Parliament’, p. 153.

** The British counterpart of the Indian Committee on Subordinate Legislation.

Liaison Between Government and Parliament

N. K. Bhojwani

IN a Parliamentary Democracy, parliamentary work constitutes one of the major preoccupations of Government. India is no exception to this. Though Parliament's direct relationship is only with the political executive, *i.e.* the Ministers, who are jointly and severally responsible and accountable to it, the day-to-day working of the system makes large claims on the time and resources of the various administrative departments through which Ministers implement the policies endorsed by Parliament and for which they function as spokesmen. Though at any given moment each House of Parliament in a bicameral system may be concerned only with a single legislative proposal or issue of Government policy or performance, pertaining to the charge of an individual Minister, the total parliamentary programme over a period of time has to cover numerous matters concerning many Ministries. The framing and working of the programme of business of Parliament, therefore, requires a good deal of coordination and planning. It also requires a formal and regular *liaison* between Parliament and Government. Different countries have adopted different methods to secure these objectives. In India, the coordination and planning of parliamentary business and momentum of regular and effective liaison between Government and Parliament has been made the responsibility of a separate "Department of Parliamentary Affairs" under a Minister of Cabinet rank. It is the purpose of this article to indicate some of the problems dealt with, the techniques evolved and lessons learnt in the working of that Department.

II

The fact that the major part of the time of Parliament is at Government's disposal to use as it likes places a special responsibility on it to employ that time wisely. With a daily sitting of $7\frac{1}{2}$ hours during the latter part of the last budget session, Government had 30 hours per week available for

official business in the *Lok Sabha* (House of the People). This gave $7\frac{1}{2}$ hours more per week than when the daily sitting used to last for 6 hours only. With a fixed limit of 5 hours per week for questions and $2\frac{1}{2}$ for private members' bills and resolutions, all additional time gained through longer sittings accrues to Government. In the *Rajya Sabha* (Council of States) also all the time other than the question hours and private members' business is for Government to utilise. Left to itself, Government would obviously be tempted to devote all of it to legislation, financial business and the parliamentary discussion and approval of its important policies and decisions. But in allocating the use of its parliamentary time, the Government has to take into account the feelings and wishes of individual members from all sides, particularly in the ranks of the opposition groups.

A Parliament with two Houses and over 700 members exemplifies a complex of emotions ranging from mild concern to intense excitement, serious agitation, deep suspicions, disappointments and frustrations, according to the matters at issue and the temperament of individual members and their party affiliations. Hopes and aspirations stir the parliamentary bosom, no less than any other. Most members are concerned over the paucity of opportunities for speaking on the subjects they are particularly interested in. Some may feel concerned over the jaundice epidemic or agitated over the exodus of people from East Pakistan; some may feel deeply suspicious about the intentions of the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs with regard to the Hindu Succession Bill or wonder whether the Minister for Home Affairs will avoid a discussion of the working of the Preventive Detention Act. Despite party discipline, the human factor plays a greater part in Parliament than is generally realised, and it would be unwise to give it less than its due weight. To the public servants essentially interested in their immediate responsibilities and anxious to get on with their work, a great deal of discussion in Parliament on matters concerning their departments, may at times seem superfluous and wasteful. To the public in the gallery, also, a similar impression may occasionally be imparted. Such an impression arises, however, from an inadequate appreciation of the nature of parliamentary institutions. The quality of eloquence, its logic, relevance and originality may sometimes be questioned but not its need. The average member rightly considers himself

accountable to his constituency and the only concrete evidence, which he can show to his constituents, of his performance in Parliament is his contribution to debates and questions. Many members have observed that local papers in their constituencies make a point of reporting their speeches extensively and thereafter reports spread to the rural areas by word of mouth. A member becomes a topic of conversation in his constituency when he puts a question in the House or speaks in a debate. The need to foster enduring traditions of truly representative Government, and to secure the cordial cooperation of all sections of the legislature, both require that due consideration be shown to the feelings and wishes of the individual members.

In determining the use of its time in Parliament, therefore, Government has to make reasonable allowances for accommodating members' requests for discussions on various subjects and for providing adequate opportunities of participation to as many members as possible on all important issues. Whatever the pressure of urgent business, reluctance to provide adequate time for the use of members causes resentment and is liable to be construed by them as reluctance on the part of Ministers concerned to face a scrutiny and adverse criticism of their policies and performance. A proper apportionment of time is thus a vital factor in promoting harmonious relations between Parliament and Government.

In the United Kingdom, there is an unwritten convention by which, at certain times, especially during debates on supplies, an agreed amount of parliamentary time is placed at the disposal of the opposition and any attempts by members on the Government side to use any of that time are firmly suppressed. A similar convention has not yet been adopted in India. In practice, however, requests from the opposition are treated with special consideration. During the last budget session, for example, the time for the voting of demands for grants for the Ministry of External Affairs was increased from 4 to 8 hours to provide for a discussion on the exodus of Hindus from East Pakistan, requested for by Shri N. C. Chatterjee and Shrimati Sucheta Kripalani, and the programme so adjusted as to place the voting of demands for the Ministry of Rehabilitation immediately thereafter. In this instance it was necessary to have the members concerned agree to and be satisfied with 4 extra hours only ; this and the idea of placing the discussion between debates on the

working of the two Ministries concerned seemed logical and acceptable. Later in the session, a further two-hour discussion was allowed on the same subject.

III

In the discharge of its task of planning and coordination of the parliamentary programme, the Department of Parliamentary Affairs has to keep in touch with all possible sources of business and to service two important higher co-ordinating bodies for the ultimate determination of

- (a) what should be included in the programme for any session ;
- (b) the priorities to be assigned to the different items; and
- (c) the amount of time to be allotted to each.

On the Government side, the highest coordinating body is a Standing Committee of Cabinet known as the Parliamentary and Legal Affairs Committee. On the Parliament side, there is a Business Advisory Committee for each House on which all groups are represented.

The Department has to keep itself informed of about all items of business likely to be brought before Parliament by all Ministries and Departments of Government. Experience has shown that Ministries tend to be over-optimistic about the date by which their projected Bills will be ready for introduction. The Department of Parliamentary Affairs finds it useful, therefore, to consult the Drafting Branch of the Law Ministry to get more accurate estimates. Ministries also tend to regard their own Bills as more important and urgent than those proposed by other Ministries. The Department of Parliamentary Affairs has to arrange a meeting of the representatives of all the Ministries usually presided over by the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs. At this meeting, the Ministries can argue and settle by a process of discussion the question of relative priority to be attached to their respective Bills and other business. Unresolved differences of opinion can be submitted for the orders of the Parliamentary and Legal Affairs Committee of Cabinet. Before each session this Committee settles the final content and priorities of Government business and also lays down the policy to be adopted in regard to private members' bills and new bills.

A tentative list of business for a session is then made by the Department from the list of pending and new bills with reference to the total time available for it, reckoned in terms of hours. After allowing for question hours and private members' business, a 10-week session now leaves a net total of 275 hours for Government business. Of this about 190 hours may be reserved for known legislative business; 30 for debates on important policy matters or events; 20 for discussion of subjects given notice of by members; 10 for 'wastage' consequent on adjournment motions, points of order, statements, laying of papers, etc., and the balance of 25 for 'surprises' which one Ministry or another is bound to spring during the session. For obvious reasons, this broad allocation is never announced. But it constitutes the framework in which business is regulated.

The tentative order of business has then to be suggested so as to ensure : (i) that each House is well supplied with business; (ii) that essential and urgent legislation is disposed of in time; (iii) that there is a reasonable mixture of legislative and non-legislative business to break the monotony; (iv) that there is an adequate interval of time between the disposal of a bill by one House and its taking up by the other; (v) that no essential business is kept on the last day or two of the session in any House; and (vi) that as much as possible of the old pending business is disposed of.

In practice it is rather difficult to balance all the above-mentioned considerations in a bicameral legislature. During the budget session of 1956, it became unavoidable to send to the *Rajya Sabha* as many as 5 major bills in succession within less than 48 hours of their being passed by the *Lok Sabha*—and all during the last few days of the session. Owing to this, certain amendments to an important bill which seemed to be acceptable in principle to the Minister could not be accepted, because there was not sufficient time to send the bill back with amendments to the *Lok Sabha*. Another important bill to amend the Constitution had to be provided for disposal in the *Rajya Sabha* on the last day of the session. It would have been very awkward if a member of the House had died on that day and caused its adjournment. Such an event once occurred in the *Lok Sabha* half an hour before the end of the last day of a session and held up a measure of considerable importance for some months.

Ministers' convenience is also taken into account as far as possible in fixing the dates and order of business. Even though parliamentary business has a prior claim on their time, it is not possible for Ministers to avoid making other engagements especially those which have to be made long in advance. Coordination of anticipated parliamentary duties and other engagements is in the public interest. In fact, it is at times desirable even to accommodate requests in the matter of dates from leaders of opposition groups, occasionally even from individual members keenly interested in particular business. Now that it is coming to be known that parliamentary business is subject to careful planning, the number of such requests is increasing. Though all such requests cannot always be accommodated, this kind of planning helps all concerned to plan their movements and engagements in and outside the capital without running the risk of their clashing with parliamentary business. It is surprising how it seems to take care of most matters, eliminates chopping and changing of business and is a factor of some consequence in promoting harmonious relations between Government and Parliament. It has certainly eliminated complaints about Government's lack of preparedness with a definite programme. Indeed, it allows the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs frequently to announce the probable order of business of the two Houses for as long as two to three weeks at a time.

Nevertheless, the planning of the legislative programme still suffers from a scramble for priority during session time. This often results in elbowing out of the queue bills for which there were reasonable prospects earlier of disposal by certain dates. It also upsets administrative plans laid out for the implementation of anticipated legislation. During the budget session of 1956, the sudden emergence of the Constitution (Amendment) Bill (in connection with sales tax on inter-State transactions in goods) resulted in postponement by three months of the passing of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Bill, though an assurance had been given to the Company Law Department that the bill would be disposed of by the end of May. Fortunately, the two rival bills came from the same Ministry.

In the same session, the Reserve Bank of India (Amendment) Bill also made an unannounced debut with a pressing demand for priority. The Department of Parliamentary Affairs successfully pointed out that neither deficit finance nor

credit inflation, the control of which by the Reserve Bank is the object of the bill, could reasonably be expected to descend on the country like a cloud-burst, the bill could therefore safely wait till the next session.

A great deal of avoidable rush and consequent strain on the drafting division of the Ministry of Law, and doubtless in the administrative Ministries also, could be obviated if Ministries were to plan their legislative proposals with due regard to their urgency, relative priority and availability of time for their consideration in Parliament. An advice issued to all Ministries in February 1956, to the effect that all the time of Parliament up to the end of April was committed to business in hand, and Ministries, therefore, need not rush with their legislative proposals, had the desired effect to some extent. But there still appears to be an impression—though incorrect—that the introduction of a bill assures a place of priority for it. It seems advisable therefore to exercise a control on the introduction of bills. In the absence of such control, many bills, though introduced, have remained on the pending list for too long a period.

IV

Closely allied with the order of business is the problem of the allocation of time for each item. The Indian Parliament has evolved a practice, which is peculiar to it and rather uncommon elsewhere, of allocating a specific period of time for each item of business. In the *Lok Sabha*, particularly, it is uncommon nowadays for any business to be taken up without a pre-determined time-allocation for it, within which it has to be completed.

The allocation in terms of hours is unique in the sense that the time allocation is initially agreed to by representatives of all parties composing the Business Advisory Committee and subsequently by the House when the Committee's recommendations are presented to it by the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs with a motion for their acceptance. The recommendations are generally accepted by the House because they emanate with the prior agreement of the representatives of various parties. With this practice, it is possible to plan the day-to-day business of Parliament almost with the precision of a railway time-table.

The allocation of time is based on a careful study of bills. It is proposed in the first instance by the Department of Parliamentary Affairs. Leaders of opposition groups are frequently consulted in the lobbies and elsewhere. Frequently, Ministries concerned cannot resist the temptation to tender advice on what would be reasonable time. To them the bills generally appear to be so simple, well thought-out and non-controversial as to require only a little time for disposal and, therefore, meriting priority. After reasonably discounting the views of Ministries whenever offered, the Department prepares its recommendations and makes them seem as reasonable as possible so as to facilitate acceptance by the Business Advisory Committee.

The meetings of the Business Advisory Committee can be quite stormy with the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs as the principal subject of attention. The usual charge against him is that his recommendations for allocation of time are unrealistic and designed to hustle the House.

From the point of view of the individual members, the agreed assignment of a time-limit for each item of business does restrict opportunities for eloquent intervention on all matters in which they may be interested. On the other hand, the system also serves to prevent the deliberate development of obstructive tactics of individual or organised opposition groups.

V

With a clear picture of what Parliament has to do and in what order and time, the two Houses are set out on their journey. Constant watch has to be kept on the progress of business in them and their requirements of it.

Constant vigilance is also necessary for maintaining cordial procedural relation between the two Houses. Each House is rather jealous of its rights and prestige and reacts quickly when anything amounting to discourtesy or indifference in form or procedure occurs. Thus it was necessary to take notice of the fact that the *Rajya Sabha* was in recess when the Appropriation Bill for Vote on Account for Travancore-Cochin State was passed by the *Lok Sabha* at the end of March 1956. If the Bill had been sent to the *Rajya Sabha* immediately, which *Lok Sabha* Secretariat would have

been well within its rights to do, it would have been deemed to have been passed by both Houses within fourteen days because the *Rajya Sabha* would not have been able to consider and return it within that period. It was, therefore, arranged with *Lok Sabha* Secretariat that the transmission of the Bill to *Rajya Sabha* be delayed till a week before that House reassembled. The right of the *Rajya Sabha* to consider the Bill was thereby preserved.

But when the Department tripped up on another matter, murmurs of displeasure were audible. This occurred when a bill was brought forward to replace another, which had been passed by the *Rajya Sabha* but was pending in the *Lok Sabha* and had been allowed to be withdrawn. The new bill was, however, introduced in the *Lok Sabha*. Some members of the *Rajya Sabha* were hurt over this neglect of their prior right to consider the substitute bill, just as some members of the *Lok Sabha* were displeased when the Minister for Finance said something in the *Rajya Sabha* about the leakage of the last budget before he had an opportunity of doing so to the *Lok Sabha*. The two Houses are equally sensitive to the attention or lack of it with which they are heard by Ministers and strongly object to a Minister being absent while a matter relating to his responsibilities is being discussed in the House. It is the duty of the Department of Parliamentary Affairs to ensure that any comment in this regard is brought to the notice of the Minister and any general observations made by the Chair, to the notice of all Ministers. When matters like the President's Address, general discussion on the budget or a debate on the Five Year Plan in which the work of many Ministers is liable to figure, come up for consideration, a daily duty roster is prepared for various Ministers for the period of discussion, to ensure the presence of 5 to 6 Ministers throughout the discussions. This practice, introduced recently, has worked well and apparently given much satisfaction.

Equally satisfying, though rather taken for granted, are the efforts made to render to Parliament an account of action taken on assurances given to it by Government. In their dealings with Parliament, Ministers are often led into giving assurances. This frequently occurs during the question hour. On certain days as many as twenty assurances may be recorded. They largely arise from replies to questions stating that the information asked for is being collected and would be placed on the table in due course. But there are many other

observations of Ministers which amount to assurances for doing one thing or another. Thus a Minister may promise to investigate a certain matter which a member may refer in a supplementary question. He may undertake to bring forward a piece of legislation which will incorporate the provisions of a bill brought forward by a private member and on that undertaking the member may be persuaded to withdraw his bill. Similarly an amendment to a bill may be withdrawn on an assurance being given that through executive action Government will ensure the object of the amendment.

Government's accountability to Parliament implies that all such assurances should be implemented faithfully. The Department of Parliamentary Affairs keeps track of such assurances and sees to it that Ministries implement them satisfactorily. Action taken on assurances is reported from time to time to the House concerned by the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs and also communicated to the individual members concerned.

VI

A little research in the subject has shown that considerable administrative effort could be economised through a more careful drafting of replies to questions and in making statements on the floor of the House. In this, Ministries and Ministers exhibit sharp differences of approach and methods. Some Ministers rarely say anything which is liable to create an obligation for future action. Some are extremely liberal in promising action on suggestions made by individual members. Likewise some Ministries are prone to dispose of questions by stating that the matters referred to are under consideration. Supplementaries on such questions tend to end up in unnecessary assurances, unless Ministers are careful. That it is possible to control the number of assurances given is shown by the effect of the advice occasionally tendered by the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs to his colleagues, to exercise caution in making statements amounting to assurances and to give assurances only when they are meant to be given. The burden of accountability arising from assurances given, however, continues to be heavy.

In this respect and in certain others also it appears that Ministries have yet to master the proper techniques of dealing with parliamentary work. Their approach to it seems to

be excessively cautious and in consequence indiscriminating. The priority attaching to parliamentary business may be a contributory factor. Ministers' attitudes doubtless play their part also. The rules of procedure and conduct of business in Parliament and the methods of the secretariats of Parliament should also accept some responsibility for this. All told, the work probably makes heavier demands on the time and energy of the administration than is necessary or intended.

Let us take the case of cut motions, *i.e.* motions to make a token cut in the demands for budget grants made with the object of raising a discussion regarding particular point of failure or inadequacy of policy or administration. Hundreds of them are given notice of in every budget session. They continue to pour into Ministries right up to the end of the day previous to that fixed for the discussion and voting of grants. There is hectic activity in the Ministries to prepare briefs on as many of them as possible regardless of their importance and of the fact that there is no discussion as such on individual cut motions. Such of them as are eventually moved, are put to the vote collectively. A great deal of labour could doubtless be saved by a discriminating selection and by restricting the briefs only to matters which are likely to be referred to by members or to which Ministers may like to refer. It is obviously not possible for members to refer to all subjects covered by cut motions, much less for Ministers to deal in their replies with all the points made by members. Most Ministers do not speak at the beginning of the discussion of their demands. Some do and seem to succeed in setting the tone and pattern of discussion. An amendment of the rule of procedure regarding cut motion also seems to be called for, to provide for two days' notice of cut motions instead of one day, to allow more time to the departments to sort them out.

Questions in Parliament constitute another time-consuming task. The number of questions of which notice is given is very large. Many of them are of doubtful admissibility. The secretariats of the two Houses have introduced a system of referring such questions to the Ministries concerned for a "statement of facts" which would assist in deciding whether the question should be admitted. In sending such statement of facts the Ministries tend to labour far too much and prepare full replies. It will perhaps suffice if they stated whether (*i*) a question involves repetition

of another put earlier ; (ii) it is acceptable, and if not, why not; (iii) it involves expenditure of time, money and labour out of proportion to its intrinsic value; (iv) information it seeks is available in a published document. There is also need for increasing the 10-day limit of notice of questions, quicker intimation of disallowance, postponing of dates for replies where necessary and a better screening of questions to exclude those which seek information of no particular significance. It also appears that in respect of questions pertaining to attached and subordinate offices, Ministries do not generally make enough use of material in their files or returns and reports already in their possession. This often results in promising information at a future date and carrying forward unfinished business. The nature of a question doubtless determines the amount of work it demands. In this respect, legislators too could show more discrimination and a better sense of values.

VII


The function of the Department of Parliamentary Affairs to act as a machinery for liaison between Government and Parliament, extends not only to the business done in open sessions of the two Houses but also to some extent to business done in Committees of Parliament such as the Public Accounts Committee and the Estimates Committee. Situations of some difficulty are liable to arise if in the course of their deliberations such Committees ask for disclosure of information or production of files and documents and the Ministry concerned feels that the material is either irrelevant or such as to make its disclosure undesirable in the public interest. In such cases the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs may have to intervene in order to secure appropriate directions from the Speaker.

Another important item in which there is scope for further and more fruitful liaison between Government and Parliament may also be mentioned here. India is a big country and with the ever-growing extension of government activities and development planning, it seems essential that the members of the national legislature should see and know the country in all its diversity if they are to perform their duties with the necessary knowledge and understanding of facts and problems of all parts of the country. Despite the fact

that members are now given railway passes to travel without restriction, it will be rash to conclude that travel-mindedness, much less travel-for-learning, will develop without properly organised and conducted tours. Experience of three organised visits, by members to Bhakra and Nangal and to the Forest Research Institute and Survey of India at Dehra Dun, has demonstrated that such tours can provide wider and deeper understanding of national problems and greater appreciation of the vastness and complexities of administrative tasks and of the need for conferring on the men on the spot, engaged in the execution of these tasks, an adequate means of authority even at the risk that errors of judgments may occasionally occur. Such visits may provide the answers to many questions which need no longer be put in Parliament and suggest others for consideration.

VIII

An attempt has been made to describe in these pages the nature and purpose of the liaison which subsists between two of the major organs of the body politic, namely, Parliament and Government. The machinery evolved for this purpose in India is still in the process of development and perfection, but it has already demonstrated its effectiveness. If in describing its working and suggesting areas for improvement, the writer has given the impression of presuming to criticise his betters, he has been guided solely by consideration of a sincere and objective evaluation and without any intention to pass judgments on the actions of individual Ministers or members of Parliament.



Nationalisation of Telephone Companies

T. R. Mantan

BARRING the company-managed Railways, the first privately worked undertakings to be nationalised in India were the telephone companies operating in big cities, namely, Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Ahmedabad and Karachi. The history of these privately owned telephone systems dates back to 1877 when the possibilities of working the telephone on a commercial basis were first visualised. Though the Government of India were then already operating the telegraph services through the agency of the Indian Telegraphs Department, these had not yet proved commercially successful and they did not like to be drawn into a new venture the commercial possibilities of which were yet uncertain. The Government acting on the precedent of the United Kingdom, where similar licences were granted to private companies, decided to grant licences for establishing telephone systems in the big cities of India. These licences were first given in 1881. In 1903, new licences were granted to the companies for a term of 60 years with an option to Government to acquire their systems on the expiry of a period of 20, 30 or 40 years.

The first opportunity for the Government to exercise the option was due in 1923, and the question was taken up immediately after the first World War. The prevailing atmosphere in the Central Government in those days was full of schemes for retrenchment and economy and no one was in a mood to incur expenditure on new schemes which might prove to be unremunerative or involve future capital liabilities to any large extent. Most of telephone equipment of the companies was very old and in urgent need of replacements. That would have cost Government a great deal of money and after all the necessary improvements had been effected, the systems might not after all turn out to be remunerative. The Government, therefore, decided to give a fresh lease of 20 years to the telephone companies on the understanding that they would modernize their telephone systems.

The next occasion for the Government to take over the private telephone systems arose in 1943. The matter was taken up for consideration four or five years before the due date for the exercise of the option to acquire. The telephone systems in the big commercial centres of India like Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Ahmedabad and Karachi, run by private companies, were then in a very flourishing condition. The companies were able to pay rich dividends to their shareholders even after paying a royalty of 5% to Government on the gross earnings. This time the Government of India decided to acquire the systems. Apart from the fact the private telephone systems had proved to be commercially remunerative, and there was good reason to believe that extension of the system to other centres would be a self-supporting service. Government also realised that from the point of view of standardisation of equipment, economy in operation, rationalisation of rates and planning for future development etc., it was necessary to integrate the entire telephone system of country under a unified control.

II

The decision to acquire private telephone systems brought in its wake administrative, financial and organisational questions of various kinds. The most important of these was the acquisition of physical assets of the companies, which involved valuation of all the properties and assets. Fortunately, provision had already been made in the licences granted to the companies. It had been laid down that Government would pay to the companies the "then value", i.e. the market value at the time of purchase. Even so, this definition of "then value" might have presented difficulties in interpretation but for the U.K. precedent in the matter. In that country the telephone systems had been nationalised about the year 1911. The interpretation of the various terms in the British Agreements, which in respect of the payment of purchase prices were similar to the Indian licences, had been the subject of a law suit and the court had interpreted the term the "then value" as the cost of reconstructing the assets on the basis of the market prices prevailing on the date of acquisition, having due regard to the state of depreciation, and other relevant factors.

The Government of India took up the question of valuation of the assets of telephone companies in November

1939, when the second World War had already broken out. It was thought that the maintenance of an efficient telephone service in big cities would be very important during the War and since the companies, who had been informed about the Government's decision to purchase their undertakings, would no longer be interested in making provision for the proper maintenance and the normal expansion of their systems, the Government should, if possible, take over the systems before 1943 by negotiation with the companies. It was necessary, therefore, that the valuation should be completed as early as possible. The assets of the companies were of various kinds, comprising lands, buildings, plant, machinery, equipment, etc. Some of these were very old, dating back to 40 or 50 years while others were very recent additions. As the orthodox method of valuing each and every kind of asset separately would have taken a very long time and required the employment of a large staff of engineers, it was decided that valuation should be done by the accountants' method, i.e. according to the book values of the various assets as shown in the account books of the companies which had been audited by registered auditors. This involved certain risks against which precautions had to be taken. For example, the companies had been reconstituted in 1923 when their assets were revalued and the original book values had been appreciated to permit dilution of the share capitals in order to give the benefit of appreciation in the value of the assets to the old shareholders. After the book values of the assets had been correctly ascertained, it was essential to calculate the appreciation in prices between the date of the original installation of the assets and the date on which Government were intending to acquire them, i.e. the present-day cost of reconstruction had to be worked out and the cost so worked out had then to be depreciated by applying the correct rates of depreciation on the basis of life of each asset.

III

After the purchase price payable to the telephone companies had been worked out on this basis, certain legal difficulties arose in the acquisition of the telephone companies systems before 1943, which was next due date for exercising the option to acquire. It would have been possible to overcome the legal difficulties by new legislation, but nationalisation was in those days looked upon as an exceptional measure and Government had to proceed very cautiously. As the

Government wanted to proceed strictly in accordance with the law, it was considered desirable to adopt some other method for acquiring indirect control over the private telephone systems, leaving the question of direct purchase by the Government to be completed in 1943 under the terms of the Agreement. Advantage was therefore taken of the provision of the Indian Companies Act under which one company could purchase the share capital of any other company or companies. A special private company, to be known as the "Government Telephones Board Limited" was therefore set up to acquire the share capitals of the telephone companies at Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. The Bombay Company also controlled the telephone systems at Karachi and Ahmedabad.

The "Government Telephones Board Ltd." was registered in 1940 as a new company and this was, perhaps, the first time that Government promoted a holding company for acquiring a commercial concern and thereby created a unique precedent in India—of a Government-owned company operating a commercial enterprise. The private company form of organisation has since been adopted for operating many of the new Government-sponsored industries like the Indian Telephones Industries Ltd., Sindri Fertilizers Ltd., Hindustan Cables Ltd., Bharat Electronics Ltd., etc. This form of organisation allows the Government commercial and industrial undertakings the necessary autonomy in the management of their affairs on business lines which is vital to their successful working and expansion, while overall control and guidance of Government is maintained through the officers of Government who are appointed as members of the Board of Directors. In the case of general public utility service like the telephones, direct departmental management was considered more suitable and the telephone systems were directly acquired by Government as soon as it could legally be done, *i.e.* the transfer from company to Government management in 1943, did not present any difficulty as the Government were at that time the virtual owners, through the Government Telephone Board Ltd., of all telephone systems.

IV

While the most difficult part of the transaction in the nationalisation of the telephone undertakings was the question of valuation, the questions relating to organisation and taking over of staff were also important.

The telephone companies, although they were registered in India, were mostly owned by foreign interests; in particular, more than 50% of the shares were held by a British telephone company. Each of the companies had its own Board of Directors and a highly paid European Managing Director in addition to a large staff of high salaried technical officers who were also mostly Europeans. In order to make the transition from company management to Government ownership as smooth as possible, the entire personnel of these companies was taken over on the then existing terms and conditions of service except the highly paid staff like the Managing Directors. The latter were offered very short-term contracts on slightly lower salaries—their retention in service being necessary to tide over the immediate difficulties created by the transfer. Their services were, however, dispensed with after the expiry of these short contracts. The technical staff were offered service contracts for two to three years at a time. All the Indian staff were retained on a permanent basis and their existing terms and conditions of service were allowed to continue until such time as the Government of India were able to offer them the departmental scales of pay and conditions of service.

The companies' staff used to get various kinds of concessions and allowances, generally not given in Government service. For example, most of the companies paid an annual bonus to their staff. One of the companies was also paying the income-tax on behalf of their staff. In some cases free lunches and dinners were provided for the operative staff to reduce the incidence of absenteeism, save time, etc. Any reduction in the total emoluments of the companies' employees would have caused great resentment and discontent among the staff, which, in turn, would have adversely affected the efficiency of service. It was, therefore, decided that total emoluments inclusive of allowances, concessions, etc., should not be reduced. The cash equivalents of the concessions which the former companies' employees enjoyed were worked out and these were taken into account in arriving at the new total emoluments for various categories of personnel.

The question of fitting in the newly acquired telephone systems into the Post & Telegraphs Department was next taken up. The matter had to be considered both from the point of view of the organisational set-up immediately after

nationalisation and the ultimate place which the large telephone units were to occupy in the overall integrated administration of the Department. From the very beginning, it was fully recognised that these telephone systems would have to be treated as separate administrative entities in view of the distinctive nature of work, size and revenue-earning capacity and that it would not be in the interests of efficiency of service to place them under the existing P. & T. circles which already constituted fairly heavy administrative 'charges'. There was not, therefore, much difference in the immediate and ultimate organisational set-up of the newly acquired telephone systems which were formed into separate telephone districts, directly under the control of the Directorate General of Posts & Telegraphs like other P. & T. circles.

V

In retrospect, it appears that the acquisition of the private telephone systems was a long drawn-out process. It could have been considerably shortened by enactment of special legislation; at least the intermediate step of setting up a Government owned private company for acquiring the shares of the telephone companies could have thus been avoided. But nationalisation by legislation was then not in consonance with the spirit of the times and the Government had to act strictly within the framework of the existing laws. Nationalisation on a large scale was ushered in by the Labour Government in the U.K. after the second World War; and in India it came still later, *i.e.* after the attainment of independence in 1947.

The experience gained in the nationalisation of the telephone companies was later utilised in the acquisition of the Overseas Communication Service, which is concerned with the operation of the external telegraphs both cable and wireless, radio telephones and radio services. This service was previously in the hands of a private licensed company, known as the Indian Radio & Cable Communications Co. Ltd. In this case, however, it was not necessary to purchase the shares of the company and the service was acquired in January 1947 on a valuation which was done exactly as in the case of the telephone companies. The employees were also taken over as in the case of the telephone companies, at first on their then existing conditions of service, and later fitted into departmental scales of pay.

Problems of Delegation

K. Khosla

AS an organization grows in size and complexity, the top man must delegate, that is, "entrust to another's care" a portion of his responsibility and authority, simply because the job has grown too big for him. The higher his position in the hierarchy, the wider his span of supervision and responsibility and the greater his need for delegation. We must delegate not only a part of the general management function, but also of "functional management", that is, management of specialist functions like engineering, accounts, and human relations, and use specialists in the interests of efficiency and economy.

What Cannot Be Delegated

The problem of delegation may be considered in terms of duties, authority and accountability. An executive may delegate a portion of his duties and authority but not accountability. He may re-delegate much or little, to many or to a few, but the liability for the discharge of his total function must remain with him. If any mistakes are made by his staff, he must accept responsibility for them, and not "pass on the buck".

How Much to Delegate

The degree of delegation depends upon the size of the enterprise, its stage of development, the personalities at the top and the quality of the executive hierarchy as a whole.

Broadly speaking, the larger the size of the organization, the more numerous and complex the problems and the greater the need for delegation.

Again, there can only be an inverse correlation between delegation and the age of an organization. An enterprise which is experiencing birth pangs or is going through an economic crisis and is struggling to arrive at stability, needs a highly centralised command for obvious reasons. But once stability is reached, decentralisation or delegation becomes necessary for the continuance and growth of the enterprise.

To take the instance of the nationalised coal industry in Britain, complaints of over-centralisation have not been infrequent. Yet, the Fleck Committee—Mr. Fleck, by the way, is Chairman of Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd.—in its report to the National Coal Board in January 1955, came to the conclusion that considering the industry's backwardness, its shortage of high quality personnel, and the difficulties of the task of amalgamating some 900 collieries previously controlled by some 800 firms, the Board's administration could not be said to be over-centralised. Some decentralisation has doubtless taken place since the vesting day in 1947 and more should follow as the organization gets older.

The third factor determining the degree of application is the personalities at the top and the quality of the executive hierarchy as a whole. If the top executive is egoistical and regards everybody else a fool, or is too fond of power or is unable to grow out of his past, when, as an accountant or a super-craftsman, he did most of the work himself, delegation would be inadequate or ineffective or both. Delegation also becomes difficult, if the executives down the line are of low calibre. But, here the blame lies with top management. Why promote unpromotable material?

II

Process of Delegation

The process of delegation may be explained by reference to the Tata Iron & Steel Company (usually referred to as Tisco). While centralisation was inevitable in its early stages, it is perhaps true that until recently the rate of decentralisation had not kept pace with the size and age of the organization or with the requirements of the times. Executive morale at different levels naturally suffered in consequence. The management realised that further delegation of responsibility and authority was necessary not only to disburden executives at different levels of unnecessary routine and enable them to devote more time to thinking and planning, but also to develop executives down the line and reinfuse confidence into them. On the 17th of January, 1955, a Management Research Unit was set up as part of the Managing Agents' organization at Jamshedpur, and one of its first assignments was to prepare instruments of delegation for different levels of management both vertical and horizontal. As a result of this study, it was found that while the organization

was sufficiently decentralised at the level of the Managing Agents, the divisional and departmental levels were over-controlled, and also that the scope for decentralisation at these levels differed in respect of financial and personnel activities. Eventually, sixteen separate instruments of delegation were prepared and issued by management, covering executives from the General Manager downwards. As a result, there has been a considerable reduction in the workload at different management levels. It may be added that in the preparation of these instruments, a wide use was made of the technique of inter-management consultation, not only because such consultation is always a source of satisfaction to the parties consulted, but also because at the executive level, it is the man that largely makes the job and, therefore, he is the right person to advise if the proposed delegation would meet his requirements.

Nor were these instruments of delegation regarded as static or fixed for all time. In dealing with the subject of delegation in such a vast organization as Tisco's some omissions are almost inevitable; besides, experience can always point to new needs and possibilities. In fact, some changes have already been made in the instruments of delegation either on top management's own initiative or on suggestions received from the executives concerned.

It is also the intention of management to carry delegation further down the line. It is felt, however, that before this is done, the supervisory staff should be given some management training. With this object in view, a Company Information Course was organised towards the end of 1953, and it ran for a period of about a year and a half and covered some 1200 supervisors. The Course sought to improve their knowledge and understanding of company policies, methods and procedures and the whys and wherefores, and also to draw out the views and opinions on various matters of common interest. A start has also been made with T. W. I. (Training Within Industry). This will be followed by other courses, as the need for training can never end. In addition, the Management Research Unit is now engaged on the codification of establishment rules and procedures for the guidance of the supervisory staff. As soon as the conditions are felt to be ripe, consultations will be held with a representative cross-section of the supervisory staff and suitable instruments of delegation for them worked out.

III

Methods of Delegation

As a result of a recent study of organization planning and of delegation as practised in some fifty leading companies, the National Industrial Conference Board of New York has developed the following four principles of delegation for the guidance of executives* :

- (a) The responsibility and authority to be delegated should be clearly defined, preferably in writing;
- (b) Authority should be delegated commensurate with the responsibility to be discharged;
- (c) A person should be accountable only to the person who delegates authority and responsibility to him; and
- (d) The degree of delegation should be proportional to the availability of effective controls.

The Tisco have accepted these principles, not so much as the specific basis of delegation, as parts of the broader scheme of organization, planning and control. The management realises that before it can improve what exists, it must know what exists and that for this purpose, as experience elsewhere has proved, written job descriptions and organization charts should prove invaluable.

It is generally argued that written job descriptions tend to dry up the springs of initiative by confining an executive to a narrow, rigidly defined area. This danger is not real, if the descriptions are properly written up. They should indicate a broad area in which the individual can operate, grow and expand, establishing at the same time, harmonious relationships with other executives. Nor is the area once defined fixed for all time. It may be broadened on the basis of experience, if necessary.

After careful study and consideration, the Tisco management came to the conclusion that it should, first of all, collect all relevant information about each executive position and prepare a management guide, patterned—subject, of course, to certain modifications to suit local conditions—on that of the Standard Oil Company of California, which is

* *Management Record*, March 1955, pp. 90-92, 122-124.

one of the best guides in existence. The first question the management had to face was—how best could such information be collected?

It was decided to use a questionnaire for the purpose. A draft questionnaire was prepared, and discussed at great length with two *ad hoc* committees, one representing a fair cross-section of the Works departments and the other the departments outside the Works. Care was taken to ensure that the questionnaire as it finally emerged from these discussions commanded the widest possible measure of agreement. The next step was to pre-test the questionnaire and for this purpose the members of the two committees were requested to fill it up in respect of their own positions. The results of the pre-test were satisfactory and copies of the questionnaire have been circulated to the chief superintendents and departmental heads. The staff of the Management Research Unit have sat with the executives and been over the questionnaire with them, giving such assistance as was required, and already about 60% of the executives have sent in their replies. It is to be hoped that the Management Guide should be ready in two years' time. A specimen job-description will be found in the *Notes* at the end of the article.

In brief, the main objectives in compiling a Management Guide are :

- (i) To designate the duties and responsibilities of each executive position, so that each individual knows what is expected of him, and unnecessary activities, overlapping of functions and gaps between responsibilities, if any, are eliminated and 'empire-building' is avoided.
- (ii) To establish and clarify relationships between organizational levels. This should make for improved team-work and co-ordination within the organization, so essential for the successful working of the process of delegation.
- (iii) To define staff-line relationships. Here the basic principle is that the operations of a line-and-staff organization like Tisco's must be managed, administered and controlled basically through the line.
- (iv) To establish authority commensurate with the duties delegated to each management position.
- (v) To improve the company's organization structure, observing among other recognised principles of organization, the "unity of command" principle, namely, that no person should have more than one boss for the same function.

The information that is being collected about the different executive positions will be useful for the following purposes also :

- (a) the selection, transfer and promotion of executives;
- (b) the development of a job rotation programme designed to widen the experience of promising executives;
- (c) the appraisal of executive performance;
- (d) the development of suitable training course for executives based on common executive weaknesses discovered through executive appraisal; and
- (e) as a possible aid in the evaluation of executive positions in terms of the relative duties and responsibilities of different positions.

Incidentally, job rotation, executive appraisal and development of training courses [items (b), (c) and (d) above] are some of the essential steps in any executive development programme.

Suitable executive appraisal forms as well as procedures for supervisory selection and promotion have been evolved. The nineteen critical factors on which an executive is to be appraised include delegation as well as planning and organising, handling people, and sociability and co-operativeness which are essential for the effective working of delegation. The appraisal form covering these factors is reproduced below.

IV

Availability of Controls

There must also be an effective system of controls commensurate with responsibility and authority delegated, to draw the attention of top management to deviations from established plans and programmes in respect of operations, costs, etc. Such controls, if properly understood at all levels, cause little difficulty in practice. The difficulty arises when, in order to satisfy itself in a general way that everything is proceeding according to plan, the top executive asks questions which amount to simple request for information in the beginning but may end up unwittingly with supervision or with suggestions which have the force of commands. In order to avoid this difficulty, the Tisco management have

adopted a policy that having delegated authority to lower management levels and thus having passed a self-denying ordinance, it must accept and support the decisions of the lower levels as management decisions. *If it is not satisfied with the over-all performance of an executive, it should change him rather than interfere in decisions that belong to him.*

Delegation and Time-Span of Decision

A clear-cut definition of duties and responsibilities of each executive position, clarification of organisational and staff-line relationships, establishment of limits of authority commensurate with responsibility, and a general streamlining of the Company's organisation structure with a suitable executive development programme should serve not only to facilitate the working of delegation but also to curtail the time-span of decision. Some of the other ways of reducing this time-span are :

- (a) "Responsibility with commensurate authority should be delegated to the lowest level at which all facts for an intelligent decision are available". The man "on the spot" being well acquainted with local conditions, conventions and practices can give quicker decisions than a remotely placed authority.
- (b) The top executive must have access to adequate facts so that he may be able to arrive at correct decisions with the minimum loss of time. If his workload is too heavy and every other possibility of delegation has been exhausted, he should be provided with "staff assistance", and if necessary, with "line assistance".
- (c) A proper study of office organisation, methods and procedures, and of possibilities of mechanisation of clerical work may suggest measures that would increase efficiency and reduce the time-span of decision. For such study, the British Treasury and on its example, firms like Unilever Ltd., and Joseph Lucas in England and the Central Government and some of the State Governments in India have set up what are called "Organisation and Methods Divisions".

V

In this article, nothing more has been attempted than to give a bird's-eye-view of some of the major aspects of the problem of delegation. If it succeeds in stimulating thought and interest in the subject, it will have served its purpose.

NOTES

I

ANNUAL EXECUTIVE APPRAISAL

IMPORTANT:

- (1) The executive should be appraised in his present position only.
- (2) Personal feelings should not influence the appraisal.
- (3) Base your judgment on the entire period covered, and not upon isolated incidents alone.
- (4) Each factor should be appraised independently, uninfluenced by the rating on other factors.
- (5) Skip the factor that is not relevant.

NAME..... POSITION..... DEPARTMENT..... DATE OF APPRAISAL.....

(Circle appropriate figure against each factor that is applicable)

Rating by higher executives. (Enter appropriate figure only if different from original rating)

Ex.A. Ex.B. Ex.C. Ex.D.

1 POOR

2 FAIR

3 AVERAGE

4 GOOD

5 EXCELLENT

1. **KNOWLEDGE OF WORK:** familiarity with the various methods, processes, or procedures of the work.

Exceptional mastery of all phases of his work. Adequate knowledge of practically all of particular job. Inadequate comprehension of requirements of job.

2. **EXPERIENCE:** skill and practical wisdom gained by personal knowledge.

Broad background for particular job. A fairly comprehensive background. Has some background but requires direction. Inexperienced or unsatisfactory background.

3. **PERSONALITY:** the external mannerisms consciously or unconsciously adopted in meeting situations.

Radiant, confident, poised, courteous. Pleasant, forceful. Likeable. Ill at ease, not too forceful. Negative colourless person.

5 EXCELLENT 4 GOOD 3 AVERAGE 2 FAIR 1 POOR Ex.A. Ex.B. Ex.C. Ex.D.

4. *PRESENTABILITY*: appearance, manner and dress.

Exceptionally striking.	Neat and quite striking.	Neat, but not particularly striking.	Often careless.	Slovenly and untidy.	—	—	—	—
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5. *CHARACTER*: the integrity of an individual and moral courage to admit mistakes and face performance objectively.

Has the courage of his convictions and unquestioned moral habits.	Morally sound—Tolerant.	An average human being possessing average personal weaknesses.	A person whose behaviour harms no one but himself.	A person who is a bad influence on the behaviour of the group.	—	—	—	—
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6. *MENTALITY*: the quality of mind, mental power and creative intellectual ability of a person.

Superior ability to think clearly and creatively and arrive at sound conclusions.	Worthwhile ideas of his own, and ability to make useful decisions.	Well informed on certain subjects useful in his daily work.	Little ability to comprehend, interpret or grasp new ideas.	Unable to reason logically.	—	—	—	—
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7. *SOCIABILITY*: a sense of mutual relationship, companionship and friendliness with others inside or outside the Company.

A genuine interest in people, and extremely well liked by others.	A friendly, pleasant person, happy in a group.	Willing to be a part of a group but makes little contribution.	Poorly adjusted to the group.	Unwilling to be a part of any group activities.	—	—	—	—
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8. *EXECUTIVE CAPACITY AND SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY*: the ability to execute and achieve an assigned task and willingness to assume duties.

Completes assignments in the shortest possible time. Greatest sense of responsibility.	Completes assignments in a short time. Very willing.	Completes assignments in a reasonable time. Accepts but does not seek responsibility.	Slow in completing assignments, or does not complete them.	Takes a long time to accomplish little. Irresponsible.	—	—	—	—
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5 <u>EXCELLENT</u>	4 <u>GOOD</u>	3 <u>AVERAGE</u>	2 <u>FAIR</u>	1 <u>POOR</u>	Ex.A.	Ex.B.	Ex.C.	Ex.D.
9. <i>COOPERATIVENESS</i> : an appreciation of collective action for mutual profit or common benefit.								
Greatest possible co-operativeness.	Very cooperative.	Cooperative.	Difficult to handle.	Obstructive.	—	—	—	—
10. <i>JUDGMENT</i> : the ability to grasp a situation and draw correct conclusions.								
Extremely sound judgment.	Good judgment.	Good commonsense.	Poor judgment.	Neglects and misunderstands the facts.	—	—	—	—
11. <i>INITIATIVE</i> : the desire and ability to introduce a new course of action.								
Seeks and sets for himself additional tasks, highly ingenious.	Resourceful.	Fairly progressive.	Rarely suggests.	Needs detailed instruction.	—	—	—	—
12. <i>EXPRESSION</i> : the ability to express one's thoughts and feelings both orally and in writing.								
Unusually good in expressing thoughts and feelings; master of good speech and writing techniques.	Speaks and writes expressing thoughts well.	Nothing about his speech or writing that is distinctive or distasteful.	Careless speech and writing habits.	Unable to express himself orally or in writing.	—	—	—	—
13. <i>ACCURACY</i> : a high percentage of freedom from mistakes.								
Highest possible accuracy.	Very careful.	Reasonably careful and accurate.	Relatively careless and inaccurate.	Worthless work.	—	—	—	—
14. <i>COST-CONSCIOUSNESS</i> :								
Highest possible degree of cost-consciousness.	A fairly high degree of cost-consciousness.	Reasonably cost-conscious.	Does not pay much attention to costs.	Entirely careless of costs.	—	—	—	—
15. <i>HOUSE-KEEPING</i> :								
An excellent house-keeper. Extremely orderly.	Very orderly. Almost everything in right place.	No particular disorder. Most things in right place.	Disorderliness in Unit. Many things out of place.	Unit very disorderly, untidy and unclean.	—	—	—	—

5 EXCELLENT

4 GOOD

3 AVERAGE

2 FAIR

1 POOR

Ex.A. Ex.B. Ex.C. Ex.D.

16. **HANDLING PEOPLE** : the ability to understand and handle people, appreciate their difficulties and show interest in their welfare.

Superior ability in handling people. Takes great interest in their welfare.	Good at handling people. Takes great interest in their welfare.	Satisfactory relationship. Takes great interest in their welfare.	Fails to command confidence.	Antagonises people.	—	—	—
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17. **DELEGATING WORK** : the assignment of specific responsibilities.

Superior ability in recognising individual's capacities, when delegates tasks.	Capable in recognising individual's capacities. Good at delegating.	Average ability to recognise individual's capacities and delegate.	Frequently fails to recognise individual's capacities or delegate work.	Tries to do all the work himself.	—	—	—
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18. **PLANNING AND ORGANISING** : success in organising, by planning the activities of his subordinates, delegating authority, and planning to complete tasks to schedule.

Highest possible effectiveness.	Effective under difficult situations.	Effective under normal circumstances.	Generally lacks planning ability.	Inefficient.	—	—	—
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19. **LOYALTY** : Company loyalty and an eagerness to tell others.

An extremely loyal employee, eager to express his enthusiasm to outsiders.	A very loyal employee, eager to see company policies.	Passive in his attitude toward company policies.	Critical of all company policies.	Disloyal and traitorous.	—	—	—
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Signature of approving officials : (A) _____
 (B) _____
 (C) _____
 (D) _____

Designation
 (do) _____
 (do) _____
 (do) _____

Highest possible score _____
 Actual approved score _____
 Percentage effectiveness _____

Actual
 Total possible =

Signature of appraising official _____ Designation _____

II

JOB DESCRIPTION : CHIEF INDUSTRIAL ENGINEER

I. Committee Assignments :

- (i) Recruitment Committee—Member
- (ii) Permanent Jt. Rates Committee—Member

II. General Function :

As a staff member of Management the Chief Industrial Engineer is responsible for the direction, supervision and control of the industrial engineering activity of the Company in the Production and Maintenance Departments; and for the provision of functional advice or guidance as required in all industrial engineering matters.

III. Responsibilities And Authority :

Within the limits of his approved programme and Company policies and control procedures, the Chief Industrial Engineer is responsible for and has commensurate authority to accomplish the fulfilment of the duties set forth below. He may delegate to members of his Department appropriate portions of his responsibilities together with corresponding authority, but he may not delegate or relinquish his overall responsibility for results nor any portion of his accountability.

A. Operations and Activities :

1. Develop and recommend wage incentive plans for the Production and Maintenance personnel in order to improve the utilisation of labour, equipment and materials having regard to the quality requirements of products and services; formulate for approval amendments to such plans when warranted by changes in operating procedures, process or equipment; explain the plans to Works Departments when necessary and advise each Department of its rate of performance and pro-rata incentive earnings from day to day.
2. Conduct necessary studies to analyse work methods, and develop and recommend method improvement projects.
3. Advise and assist as required in the development of production planning schedules, production control systems and preventive maintenance plans.
4. Render such assistance as requested to outside consultants engaged by the Company or to Company officials in the conduct of job evaluation and development of a rationalised wage and bonus structure.
5. Through studies of the existing labour force, which is accepted to be excessive, recommend a revised standard force adequate to requirements and assist in securing the concurrence of Departmental Heads in a provisional labour force as a transitional step to the ultimate standard force.

6. Advise on the filling or non-filling of vacancies arising through natural wastage, transfers, or any other cause having regard to accepted manpower requirements.
7. Advise through the study of comparable data on the manning of new plant or equipment.
8. Re-arrange work locations; and instal new or improved work methods and procedures.
9. Prepare annual reports for submission to Management setting out the main activities of the Department during the year under review.

B. Organization :

1. Recommend changes in the basic structure of his Department normally employing approximately 70 people.

C. Personnel :

1. In respect of the personnel under him, provided the maximum basic salary of the post does not exceed Rs.....p.m. except where otherwise stated, the Chief Industrial Engineer will have the power to sanction in accordance with the rules of the Company
 - (a) promotions, transfers, grade increments, acting arrangements and allowances;
 - (b) earned leave, special leave, accident leave, leave without pay, half holidays to the ministerial staff, and advance payment of salary during furlough;
 - (c) continuance of an employee in his existing scale of pay, who has been permanently partially disabled as a result of accident whilst on duty and has been paid compensation in accordance with the rules and is still capable of doing his duties as efficiently as before the accident;
 - (d) acceptance of resignation, issue of a written warning, suspension, stoppage of grade increment, demotion or discharge of an employee;
 - (e) issue of certificates to employees on termination of service or in connection with insurance policies or applications for domicile.

IV. Relationships :

The Chief Industrial Engineer will observe and conduct the following relationships. He may delegate appropriate portions of such relationships to members of his Department together with proportionate authority for their proper conduct.

A. The General Superintendent

1. He is accountable to the General Superintendent for the fulfilment of his function, responsibilities and authority and relationships and for their proper interpretation,

2. He will relieve the General Superintendent of administrative details as outlined herein or as specified by the General Superintendent.

B. Other Executives

1. The General Manager

As directed or requested, he will provide information to the General Manager regarding the productivity of equipment, labour and material in various Works Departments.

2. The Chief Superintendents & Heads of Departments

As requested, he will advise the Chief Superintendents and Heads of Works Departments in matters within his province; but in doing so, he will not assume nor will he be delegated any function, responsibility, authority or relationship belonging to any other member of Management.

C. Industrial Engineering Consultants

He will conduct such relationships with Industrial Engineering Consultants engaged by the Company as may be assigned to him by Management.



Labor supply

Manpower Administration in the United States

John F. Hilliard

MANPOWER administration in the United States is based upon two principles : (1) central formulation of national manpower objectives and policies, and (2) decentralized action to achieve the objectives through application of the policies.

This approach to manpower administration is required by the pattern of American government and by the organization of social and economic institutions. The federal government obviously must provide leadership in establishing the national objectives and policies required for sound economic growth and for national security. In addition, it must perform certain operating manpower functions which can best be performed by the national government.

However, despite the importance of the manpower activities of the federal government, in the aggregate they represent only a small fraction of the complex and various activities by which American society creates the human skills and values which it requires. The vast majority of manpower activities in the United States are carried on by state and municipal governments, school districts, private industrial establishments, trade unions, professional groups and educational institutions. For example, practically all educational activity is conducted by state and local units of government and by private institutions. Many thousands of collective bargaining agreements constitute not only the basic structure of labor-management relations but in total one of the most important aspects of manpower administration.

These circumstances create special problems of administration. On the one hand, the government must establish objectives and act through its own organizational channels to assure that its manpower activities are conducted in a manner consistent with the national interest. On the

other hand, it must find ways of exercising leadership for the vast number and variety of groups and institutions concerned with manpower matters but over which the federal government has no control whatever.

It would be pleasant but incorrect to say that the government has been uniformly successful in both these aspects of manpower administration. Only after recurrent national emergencies did it become fully recognized that the development and effective utilization of manpower resources requires that the government organize itself properly to discharge this function. Moreover, unlike all other national resources, manpower is made up of people; manpower policies must therefore painstakingly pursue national objectives without infringing the rights of individuals.

Nor, in working with non-federal agencies and private groups has it always been easy to develop the capacity to think in terms of organization around ideas, not hierarchy; to provide information and understanding without indoctrination, guidance without dogmatism, leadership without control.

Manpower Administration in a democracy is indeed a special and tenuous kind of administration. And even though its performance in the United States falls far short of perfection, it is perhaps of interest to examine briefly the administrative principles by which it is carried on.

Organization

The primary responsibility within the Government for the establishment of national manpower objectives and policies is vested in the Office of Defense Mobilization, an organ of the Executive Office of the President. Created originally by Executive Order of the President to co-ordinate and direct economic mobilization during the Korean emergency, ODM was in 1953 established by statute as a permanent agency charged with the planning of both current and long-term measures to safeguard the national security. This responsibility covers the entire range of economic functions—production, materials, transportation, communications, financial policy and manpower. Each of these major functions is under the immediate direction of an Assistant Director

of ODM who establishes arrangements within the Government and with non-governmental agencies for the co-ordination and direction of his particular function. The several functions are in turn co-ordinated and directed by the Director. Thus the formulation of manpower objectives and policies is carried on within the context of other national policies for economic growth and national security.

Policies with respect to manpower are recognized as a national concern, not simply an internal function of an agency of the Government. Consequently an elaborate system has been developed for consulting on all major policy questions not only the departments and agencies of the government, but leaders from the fields of management, labor, education and the professions.

In addition to the advice of various expert consultants counsel is systematically sought on all important manpower matters, from the following formally constituted groups.

The Inter-Departmental Manpower Policy Committee

This Committee is made up of policy-level officials representing the Departments of Defense; Commerce; Labor; Health, Education and Welfare; Agriculture; and the Selective Service System; Civil Service Commission, and the Federal Civil Defense Administration. These are the principal agencies of the Government which either provide manpower services or whose functions make major claims upon the nation's manpower resources.

The National Labor-Management Manpower Policy Committee

This Committee consists of fourteen national leaders representing labor and management in equal numbers. In addition to the great industrial associations and labor organizations, representation is provided for agriculture, transportation and retail trade.

The Committee on Specialized Personnel

This Committee consists of outstanding authorities on manpower in the sciences, humanities and the professions. Its membership is drawn from industry, education, professional societies and government departments concerned with highly trained personnel.

Additionally, from time to time *ad hoc* committees are established to make detailed studies of special problems and to recommend appropriate solutions. These committees may be comprised of members of the Cabinet, senior staff of selected departments, or of outstanding citizens concerned with manpower problems. Thus, although the Director of ODM is authorized to coordinate and direct, on behalf of the President, the manpower activities of the government, he exercises this authority only after careful consultation with those who will be significantly affected by his actions.

Moreover, policy questions of exceptional importance are discussed with the Defense Mobilization Board (a statutory Board advisory to the Director of ODM and comprised of designated members of the Cabinet), with the Cabinet or with the National Security Council. The Director sits with the Cabinet, by invitation of the President, and is a statutory member of the National Security Council presided over by the President.

Central development of manpower objectives and policies in the United States is therefore the process by which the deliberate judgment of both governmental and non-governmental leaders is crystallized and formally promulgated. Once policy has been formulated with respect to a particular manpower problem, execution becomes the responsibility of the operating departments of the government.

The principal operating agencies are the Department of Labor, the government's operating arm in the civilian manpower field; the Department of Defense, which is charged with military manpower administration; and the Selective Service System which is responsible for reconciling civilian and military manpower requirements by inducting or deferring men based on considerations of the national health safety or interest.

In order to obtain maximum effectiveness, both the Department of Labor and the Department of Defense have appointed an Assistant Secretary for Manpower, who is responsible for directing and coordinating the manpower activities of his respective department. Since the Selective Service System has no function other than manpower, the Director personally directs manpower operations.

The other departments and agencies which are directly concerned with manpower have appointed sub-cabinet level officers to be responsible for coordinating the function within their agencies and for liaison with ODM. These officers make up the Inter-Departmental Manpower Policy Committee.

Perhaps an illustration of how this organizational arrangement works out a major problem would assist in clarifying it.

In 1953 the National Labor-Management Manpower Policy Committee, after careful study, concluded that the military reserve program had become obsolete—that in the event of national emergency a great many highly trained men would be immediately withdrawn from critically important civilian jobs for service in low priority military assignments. The Committee recommended that the ODM or the President establish a special group of experts to study the problem and to recommend the principles of a new reserve program.

This was done. In January 1954 a special Committee on Manpower Resources for National Security, under the chairmanship of the President of the American Management Association, submitted its comprehensive report and recommendations. Upon receiving the report the President requested the Director of ODM and the Secretary of Defense to devise a new program for submittal to the Congress.

In consultation with the several committees mentioned, a new National Reserve Plan was worked out during 1954 and approved by the National Security Council. In January 1955 it was transmitted to the Congress as a major element of the Administration's legislative program. This legislation was enacted by the Congress in mid-1955, and during the past year sweeping modifications in the organization and training of the reserve forces have been initiated.

Problems of less magnitude are, of course, dealt with more simply and expeditiously.

For example, the Director of ODM found that certain cities were experiencing severe unemployment in the midst of very high level employment throughout the country. To better utilize this unemployed manpower, develop skills and preserve morale, he directed that preferential treatment in the award of government procurement be given to communities

determined by the Secretary of Labor to be areas of substantial unemployment.

In implementation of this policy the following action program is being carried out on a continuing basis :

The Department of Labor periodically surveys labor market areas and certifies those which qualify for preferential procurement consideration. In addition, it provides special assistance to these areas in assessing their manpower skills and in determining what additional training is needed.

The Department of Commerce assists them in evaluating their plant facilities, natural resources and financial potential. Technical assistance and advice is provided on how to bid on government procurement, and on attracting new plants to the area.

The Small Business Administration provides special service to plants which qualify for small business loans, for expansion or modernization.

By direction of the Department of Defense, the Army, Navy and Air Force procurement agencies establish set-asides of certain portions of appropriate procurements for negotiation with firms in the certified areas. Surveys of facilities are made, and all plants able to perform on defense procurement are placed on bidder's lists and encouraged to bid on procurements for which they are qualified. Production clinics are held to acquaint firms in surplus labor areas with the products needed in quantity and with their production specifications. Prime contractors are encouraged to place sub-contracts in these areas.

The General Services Administration, the government's purchasing agent for civil supplies, channels its procurement into these areas to the extent possible under procurement statutes and good administrative practice.

Despite the fact that *no higher prices are paid* for contracts in these areas, they have through these measures been awarded many millions of dollars worth of procurement, which of course is translated into employment, thus helping to preserve and strengthen the nation's manpower potential.

A parallel ODM policy allows firms which locate or expand in these areas certain additional tax advantages,

provided the expansion is in a sector for which the government has established an "expansion goal".

These programs do not in themselves solve problems of serious unemployment. They do help; they express the government's concern; most important of all they stimulate the communities themselves to greater initiative in solving their own manpower problems.

Policy Development and Promulgation

All national manpower policies are evolved through the foregoing organization and consultative arrangements.

No policy can accurately be said to exist unless it is explicitly stated by one authorized to state it. The National Manpower Mobilization Policy issued by the President in 1951 enunciates the manpower principles and policies for meeting a national emergency. The Director of ODM issues supplementary policies from time to time. These are published in the Federal Register and are directive to all departments and agencies of the government. Additionally, each policy indicates the specific responsibilities of each department and agency in implementing the policy. Although these policies have no directive effect outside the federal government, they are widely used for their advisory value by state and local governments and by private groups and agencies.

Periodic evaluation is made of the extent to which the objectives of each policy are being achieved. At regular intervals reports are made to the President and to the Congress on problems and achievements in the manpower field. As necessary, new legislation is developed and, after clearance with the Executive Branch, is submitted to the Congress by the President.

Perhaps the manpower problems deemed of sufficient importance to warrant formal statements of national policy will be of interest. Those promulgated thus far as major additions to the National Manpower Mobilization Policy are :

1. Policy on Distribution of Government Procurement and Location of Government sponsored Plants in areas of substantial unemployment.

2. Policy on Training.
3. Policy on Development and Utilization of Scientists and Engineers.
4. Policy on non-discrimination because of Race, Creed or National Origin.
5. Policy on utilization of Foreign and Domestic workers in Agriculture.

Numerous subordinate policy statements have been issued, and the National Labor-Management Manpower Policy Committee has issued policy statements advising to labor and management on matters of industrial safety and labor mobility.

Participation by Non-governmental Agencies and Groups

As we have seen, the federal government itself has considerable resources for decentralized execution of certain kinds of manpower policies. The Department of Labor, which is the principal operating arm of the government in civilian manpower matters, has, in co-operation with the States, a net-work of some two thousand employment offices throughout the country. Additionally, it has other offices which sponsor craftsman training, collect industrial, occupational and employment statistics and administer various labor laws.

The Selective Service System has, in addition to a Headquarters in each state, over three thousand local citizen boards. The Department of Defense has civilian and military establishments in every state; the departments of Health, Education and Welfare, Agriculture and others have extensive field organizations carrying on operating programs at state and community levels.

These and other agencies have been brought together for mutual consultation and action at regional, state and local levels as they have in Washington.

Even so, these activities would in no sense be adequate to our national needs without the widespread interest in and action on manpower problems by non-governmental institutions. The manpower function, perhaps more than any other, is a responsibility of the people of the United States.

Fortunately they have widely recognized and assumed this responsibility.

Management groups, labor organizations, professional societies, foundations and universities have established various kinds of organizations to deal with aspects of manpower in which they are particularly interested or competent. For example, the engineering societies have, through their Engineers Joint Council, established an Engineering Manpower Commission with outstanding staff and officers. The scientific societies have established a comparable Scientific Manpower Commission. Many universities and private consulting firms have established research, information and action programs in the manpower field. The American Association for the Advancement of Science has for four years conducted a Scientific Manpower Section along with the Sections in the sciences themselves. Although these are among the most notable, they are only representative of the vast number of organizations which contribute to effective manpower administration.

Not the least important function of these private groups is to advise, and if necessary, to needle the government into taking the actions which only it can take. Reciprocally, the government frequently calls upon these groups for assistance in dealing with important manpower problems. For example, it was recognized that the solution to the shortage of scientists and engineers could not be solved by the government. It obviously required a broad coordinated program with the major responsibility assumed by non-governmental elements of the economy. The President therefore created a National Committee for the Development of Scientists and Engineers, under chairmanship of the President of Ohio State University. On behalf of the President, the Director of ODM invited the presidents of nineteen of the most important management, labor, and professional organizations in the country to serve on the Committee.

The mission given to the Committee was to develop an action program and carry it out through the institutional channels of the organizations represented on the Committee. Although the men invited are among the busiest in the United States, every single one of them accepted the invitation, and are now in the process of developing and carrying out a broad national program. The National Science Foundation

(a federal agency) provides necessary staff services and serves as the link between the Committee and the Executive Branch of government.

To facilitate the making of correct manpower decisions by private and public organizations throughout the country, the government conducts extensive research and keeps these organizations and the public informed on the critical facts relating to manpower. These include labor force growth by numbers and skills; developing patterns of education and training; developing requirements by occupation, industry and geographical distribution; growing and declining career opportunities; military manpower problems and opportunities.

It is through this complex interaction between governmental and non-governmental efforts that manpower administration reaches into every community and in fact, into almost every community institution, informing and guiding, but not dictating the decisions that in total determine the success or failure of national policies. Manpower administration is, in Alexander Leightons' term, not government but governance—the sum of the actions of those governing and those governed. That these actions may be freely taken and yet consistent with the national interest is the manpower objective to which we are committed.

Thoughts on Co-ordination

S. B. Bapat

CO-ORDINATION is, in some ways, the most important and the least well-understood of the elements in the theory and practice of Public Administration. Used in the right measure and in the right way it can make a great contribution to the success of any administrative task; and yet it is not uncommon to see some of the worst administrative sins being committed in the name of co-ordination and the very purpose for which it is invoked defeated.

In the course of some twenty-five years of public service the present writer has had more than his average share of working on or with co-ordinating agencies, and has seen examples of very good and very bad co-ordination. Reflecting upon that experience an attempt has been made in this article to set out a few hints for the guidance of those who may be on the threshold of an administrative career. If it helps some of them to avoid some of the mistakes which they may otherwise make, the writer's purpose will be amply served.

II

As soon as the size and complexity of any administrative task goes beyond the capacity of one man, the process of division of labour has necessarily to be adopted. The task has to be divided into sub-tasks—sometimes merely according to size, but much more often according to the nature of each sub-task—to be discharged by a number of separate individuals or groups of persons. With such division of labour the need for co-ordination arises in order to ensure that the divided labour of the different men or groups concerned produces the intended total result in the most efficient manner, *i.e.* with the least expenditure of time, money, labour and goodwill—the last being by no means the least important, since all public administration is ultimately a matter of human relations.

For a better understanding of the *how* and *why*, it is useful to think of co-ordination being of different kinds

each with the specific objectives to secure. There are for instance :

(1) *Co-ordination to prevent conflict* : The classic example is that of the railway engineer who wishes to build his railway line by the shortest route even if it cuts across the natural drainage channels and digs borrow-pits to get the earth to raise the line above the flood level and is, therefore, in conflict with the agricultural and public health engineers who object because obstruction to the natural drainage increases the risk of floods and the accumulation of the water in the borrow-pits provides good breeding-grounds for malarial mosquitoes. Some co-ordinating authority has to step in to resolve the conflict, usually by insisting on a much larger number of culverts than the railway engineer would otherwise like to provide and by forcing him to link up the borrow-pits so that accumulated water will flow away instead of stagnating.

(2) *Co-ordination to prevent competition* : When different departments are competing for the same resource whether it be physical, as in steel, cement, etc., or human, as in manpower, or financial, such as foreign exchange, some co-ordinating authority has to step in to determine priorities and make allocations.

(3) *Co-ordination to prevent duplication and waste* : A good example is furnished by the tendency of each ministry and department to put up its own machinery to collect statistics relating to its own particular subject. Co-ordination makes it possible to set up a more economical central machinery which can, in the same operation, collect the necessary data for a number of different departments. To take another example, if every military unit at Command Headquarters decides to set up its own maintenance and repair shops for its vehicles, there would be great duplication and waste which is easily avoided by the provision of a central maintenance and repair depot to service all vehicles in one place.

(4) *Co-ordination to prevent hiatus in space or in time* : The object is to ensure that the resources and services are available in the right quantity, at the right time, and in the right place. For increased production of food, for instance, it is necessary that the cultivator, the seed, the fertilizer and the labour are all available in the required quantities at the right time. The writer has seen some tragic blunders, where, because of poor co-ordination in distribution, the stock of

seed kept at headquarters for a particular operation in a famine-stricken area reached the cultivators long after the proper sowing season. The same sort of tragedy can be repeated on a very large scale if in the execution of a project to set up a major industrial plant there is a delay in the arrival of either the machinery or the raw materials. It is reported that some very expensive imported electronic communications equipment had to lie idle in a certain place in India for over a year because some one had forgotten to arrange for the training of the men needed to operate it.

(5) *Co-ordination to prevent differences in approach and treatment* : A good example is furnished by the need for co-ordination of personnel policies. There is a large number of different departments and offices each of which controls a number of public servants of different grades. They cannot obviously be allowed to go their own way in the fixing of the conditions of service such as remuneration, leave, pension, discipline, etc., and a uniform personnel policy has to be laid down for the Government as a whole.

III

Co-ordination is necessary not only at the stage of policy, but also at the stage of its execution. This fact has a bearing on the form of co-ordinating machinery found most suitable at different stages. Broadly speaking, co-ordination of policy is best done by a group or collegiate body; and the co-ordination of execution by a series of executives placed in command of the different parts and at different levels of the executing machinery. The highest co-ordinating body is the Cabinet, but it is obvious that the whole Cabinet cannot find time to consider and decide all policy questions even if they are of importance. We therefore get the next level of co-ordinating authority, that is the committees of the Cabinet some of which, like the Defence Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Economic Committee, are Standing Committees while others are created *ad hoc* for dealing with particular items. Subject to the policy laid down, the Minister in charge, advised by his Secretary and secretariat staff and Heads of Executive Departments, supplies the co-ordination needed for laying down the intra-departmental policies and their execution, in so far as they do not impinge on or conflict with the matters comprised in the portfolios of any of his colleagues,

An example may be cited here to illustrate this process. The vast population of India growing steadily needs increasing quantities of food. This can only be got by increasing domestic production or importing from outside. A decision to import means using up foreign exchange which may be needed even more for the import of machinery to increase the pace of industrialisation. To what extent the extra requirements of food should be met by imports and to what extent by increase in internal production becomes a matter of major policy affecting a number of different parts of the machinery, e.g., the Finance Ministry, the Commerce and Industry Ministry, Production Ministry, etc. This decision has therefore to be made by the Cabinet and in view of its importance it is only made after the matter has been fully considered by another very high-level co-ordinating body like the Planning Commission, and since Agriculture is a State subject and food production cannot be increased without fullest cooperation from the States, also by the National Development Council. A definite target for increasing food production having thus been set as a result of policy-co-ordination, it then becomes a matter for the Minister in charge of Food and Agriculture to co-ordinate the subsidiary policies and their execution. For this purpose he has to rely upon a number of different organizations, such as the Indian Council of Agricultural Research for the development and supply of improved seed, the Central Tractor Organization for bringing waste land into cultivation, and the Agricultural Departments in the States, the National Extension Service for popularising better agricultural implements and teaching improved methods of sowing and growing crops, and so on. Provision has also to be made for improvements in quantity of storage capacity, marketing facilities, etc. Each of these tasks, in its turn requires internal co-ordination in the Ministry as a whole and in the different organizations mentioned, either by a suitably formed co-ordinating group or committee or by individual executives.

It is precisely because co-ordination has thus to be provided for at each of a whole chain of levels from Cabinet down to the District Offices and below, the danger arises that there may be *too much* of it at too high a level. While it is important to prevent competition or conflict when they are *obviously likely* to arise, it is fatal and purpose-defeating to insist on a clearance at the co-ordination level merely

because a conflict or competition may *possibly* arise. Most of the unnecessary reviews and cross-references so rightly condemned by Mr. Appleby in his report arise because the Governmental machinery is prone easily to fall into a habit-pattern of indulging in co-ordination as an end in itself and not merely as means to an end.

IV

An important fact not always sufficiently realized is that even when the co-ordinating authority is a committee it is necessary to have some one person recognized as its leader, spokesman and ultimate arbiter. In theory, the Cabinet consists of Ministers who are all equal in status and importance and authority. Nevertheless, it has to have in the Prime Minister a leader, a *primus inter pares*, some one who in the case of unresolved differences has to give the final decision. The same applies at all lower levels of co-ordination whether it be an informal committee consisting of the Secretary of the Ministry and Joint Secretaries and heads of all departments under that Ministry, or a Board of Directors of a public enterprise. Any attempt to set up a co-ordinating committee for any purpose without a clearly recognised individual at his head, frequently results only in producing vexatious delays and uncertainty all round.

At the other end where the executive co-ordination is supplied by the individual at the head of an organisation or linked group of organizations, the danger is that just because he has the power to say what shall be done he may say it without fully considering the implications of his decision or explaining it to the men below him who may have held different views. Just as a co-ordinating committee can only function properly with a recognized head, a single co-ordinator can only function properly if he provides himself, at least informally, with a co-ordinating committee of his immediate colleagues and lieutenants at the next level or two, and gives them an opportunity of expressing their opinions and advice and of understanding the reasons for whatever final decision is taken.

V

Since every co-ordinating authority must obviously have also the ultimate authority to *decide* what is to be done,

it is important that effective arrangements should be made in the co-ordinating machinery to enable the co-ordinating authority to get full information in regard to matters which have a bearing on that decision. This, in turn, leads us to the importance of recognizing that co-ordination must be an *active process*. The co-ordinating authority must have the power not only to decide what has to be done but also to ensure that it is done and calling to account those whose performance is deficient. The latter is easy where the co-ordinating authority is vested in a single executive. Where the authority is vested in a committee, it is necessary to provide it with a staff agency to keep track of the implementation of the decisions made by the co-ordinating authority. The writer has known many instances in which the failure to provide such a staff agency resulted in the ultimate failure of the co-ordinating process itself.

VI

Summing up in every-day language, co-ordination is needed in all administrative tasks (a) to prevent the people concerned from going different ways, (b) to prevent them from treading on each other's toes, (c) to keep them marching in step, and (d) to see that the right men and the right things are available in the right quantity in the right place at the right time. Such co-ordination is needed not only to decide *what* is to be done and *how*, but also to see that it is done. As the volume and complexity of groups of tasks and sub-tasks to be co-ordinated increases, there is an increasing need for co-ordination by a group rather than by a single executive. Where the co-ordination is done by a group, the group must have a recognized head who can, if need be, decide for the group. But even where it is done by a single executive it must be done in consultation with his colleagues and lieutenants. In order to enable the group to see that its decisions are really carried out by all concerned, the group must be provided with eyes, ears and limbs in the form of a staff agency. Finally, co-ordination must be used only in the right doses, as a necessary lubricant, and not as a main fuel.

Editorial Notes

We are happy to be able to publish in this issue a digest of the recent report recorded by *Mr. Paul H. Appleby* after "re-examination of India's administrative system with special reference to administration of government's industrial and commercial enterprises". The report has already evoked wide interest in India and we are glad indeed to make the cream of it available to our foreign readers through the medium of our *Journal*. Though the principal relevance of the report is to the immediate Indian situation, there is a great deal in it which is of fundamental importance and value to any government anywhere in the world.

Mr. Hilliard's article on how the U.S. Government faced and organized itself for dealing with the manpower problem, is also of very topical interest in India where we have today a similar problem of finding the men to carry out the ambitious development plans, especially in technical fields.

The present issue of the *Journal* comes out on the eve of Xth International Congress of Administrative Sciences. The Indian Institute of Public Administration is sending a formal delegation consisting of its Director, Prof. V.K.N. Menon and Shri S.B. Bapat. We hope that the contacts made at the Congress will result in an increasing flow of interesting and valuable contributions from abroad.

—Editor

Indian Institute of Public Administration

Director's Report

(July—August 1956)

I. Amendment of the Rules of the Institute

A Special Meeting of the General Body of the Institute was held at 5 p.m. on Saturday, the 25th August, 1956, to consider a resolution proposing certain amendments to the Rules of the Institute. The resolution, which was brought forward by a Sub-Committee of the Executive Council of the Institute presided over by Shri N.V. Gadgil, was passed at the Special Meeting by a more than two-thirds majority. The major changes effected by the present amendment are as follows :

(1) A new class of "Associate Members" has been introduced to admit *bona fide* post-graduate students below the age of 25 and interested in the study of public administration. They will be charged a special membership fee of Rs. 12 per year, and would have no voice in the election of office-bearers or the management of the Institute's affairs.

(2) The composition and the tenure of the members of the Executive Council has been suitably altered to provide for retirement and replacement of members by instalments at intervals. This will make for greater firmness and continuity of policy in the management of the Institute's affairs. The net effects of the altered provisions will be :

- (a) The President will continue to be elected at the Annual General Meeting each year.
- (b) The Honorary Treasurer will hold office for two years and would be elected by the Executive Council, instead of by the General Body.
- (c) The Vice-Presidents will hold office for two years but the system will ensure annual retirement and replacement for half the number.
- (d) The elected members of the Executive Council will hold office for four years but the system will ensure retirement and replacement for half of the number at intervals of two years.
- (e) In order to facilitate such periodical retirement, the number of elected members is raised from 15 to 16.

(3) Provision has also been made for the establishment of Local Branches, apart from Regional Branches. It was felt that it would be desirable to have Local Branches, especially at the university centres, of which there may be more than one in some States.

II. New Director for the Institute

Prof. V.K.N. Menon, Professor of Political Science and Director of Institute of Public Administration, Patna University, took over as the Director of the Indian Institute of Public Administration with effect from the 1st August, 1956.

III. Xth International Congress of Administrative Sciences

The Institute has decided to send a two-man delegation to the Xth International Congress of Administrative Sciences, scheduled to commence in Madrid on the 3rd September, 1956. The delegation will consist of : Prof. V.K.N. Menon, Director, and Shri S. B. Bapat, Honorary Treasurer of the Institute, Editor of the *I.J.P.A.*, Establishment Officer, Government of India, and Director, Central Organization and Methods Division. Shri Bapat will also attend the Congress as the representative of the Government of India.

After the Madrid Congress, both Prof. Menon and Shri Bapat will visit the United States for a short period on the invitation of the Ford Foundation. The main object of the tour is to study the teaching of and research in public administration at the American Universities, as well as to observe new trends of administrative practices in the departments of the Federal and State Governments. On his way back to India, Prof. Menon will spend a short time in the U.K., France, Germany and Belgium to observe the working of institutes of public administration in these countries.

IV. Committee of Direction on Study Material and Research

The second meeting of the Committee of Direction on Study Material and Research was held on the 24th August, 1956. The Committee considered a tentative list of projects which might be taken up for purposes of study and research in the near future. It also considered the question of formulating long term plans in the matter. Work on some of the research projects is expected to start immediately.

V. Building Programme

The possession of the land for the Institute's buildings was acquired on the 21st May, 1956.

The Building Advisory Committee at its meeting held on the 23rd August, 1956, finalised the building plans as prepared by the architect, who will now prepare a lay-out model as well as models of each building.

VI. Membership

A special request was recently addressed to the State Governments to enrol themselves as Corporate Members. The Governments of Bihar, Rajasthan and U.P. have already joined, while Governments of Punjab, Andhra, Madhya Pradesh and Travancore-Cochin have expressed keen interest in becoming Corporate Members. The total membership of the Institute as on the 31st August, 1956, was : Ordinary Members, 620; and Corporate Members, 30

VII. Library and Information Services

The number of books and reports has increased to about 4,550. The third instalment of the "Author Catalogue" is under print. Indexing of important articles from periodicals and news items from daily papers has recently been started.

Under the Indo-U.S. Wheat Loan Educational Exchange Program, the Librarian and Reference Officer, Shri J.M. Kanitkar, has been awarded a training grant for six months for study of Library Science in the U.S.A. He is expected to proceed to the United States towards the close of September.

News from India and Abroad

I. INDIAN

A New Role for Finance Officers

In order to promote a spirit of mutual goodwill and understanding and a really close collaboration between officers of administrative Ministries and the officers of Expenditure Finance at every stage during the formation of schemes and proposals right from their inception, the Government of India have issued orders redesignating the Finance Ministry officers dealing with expenditure proposals from the administrative Ministries as 'Financial Adviser', 'Deputy Financial Adviser' and 'Assistant Financial Adviser'. The strength of the Expenditure Division has been augmented in order to provide a whole-time 'Deputy Financial Adviser' to every Ministry (barring one or two small Ministries who share them). These officers are given accommodation in the administrative Ministries to which they are attached and are brought into consultation at the earliest possible stage in the formulation of schemes which have financial implications. This eliminates unnecessary references of papers and files and also ensures that the proposals are formulated with due regard to all financial and other consultations which have to be taken into account. Such constant contact and close cooperation is producing greater mutual understanding and brings nearer the stage when administrative officers would themselves automatically apply sound financial standards and Finance Officers would be able to fully appreciate the administrative officers' needs and problems. This process will also assist in the rapid development of sufficient trained manpower to provide every Ministry with machinery for internal financial advice and control.

Transfer of Charge

Realizing that the state of efficiency of the organization is as valuable as cash and stores, the Central O & M Division has issued instructions to all central Ministries and Departments that whenever a Branch Officer/Section Officer hands/takes over a new charge, both the relieved and relieving officers should take stock of efficiency on the date of transfer by filling in the answers to a questionnaire especially designed for this purpose. The officer taking over now knows exactly what he is inheriting, good or bad. In the event of any fault coming subsequently to light, it becomes easier to pin-point responsibility, and also, where marked improvement takes place, to give credit where it is due.

Training of Newly Recruited Clerks

At the instance of the Central O & M Division, a number of central Ministries and Departments have recently started *internal* training classes for the benefit of newly recruited clerks. Some of them have also extended the facility to give short refresher courses to new promotees to the

higher clerical grades. The training provided consists of a short course extending from 10 to 15 days for 1-2 hours per day in which lectures, coupled with practical training and demonstration, are given on various topics.

"Cash Your Ideas" Scheme for Railwaymen

The Railway Board have embarked upon a new scheme of "Cash Your Ideas" under which all grades of staff, gazetted or non-gazetted, are encouraged to come forward with constructive ideas for improving the working of railways. Monetary rewards will be given to those who give useful suggestions acceptable to the Railway Board. The fact that an employee has made an acceptable suggestion, will be recorded in his personal file and would be a factor in his favour at the time of promotion to a higher post. The suggestions received will be scrutinized by the high-powered five-member Standing Screening Committee (Inventions and Suggestions).

Civil Jobs for Retired Army Officers

Under the retirement rules applicable to the Defence Forces, many able officers have to retire at the early age of 45 to 48. At this time, they are at the prime of their physical and mental powers, and family responsibilities, such as the education of children, are at their heaviest. And yet, after retirement, they cannot easily secure suitable employment in other walks of life.

In order to mitigate the hardship and also to ensure that the ability and experience of such officers are utilised to the fullest extent in the public interest, special machinery has been set up in the Government of India to facilitate their absorption in suitable civil employments in Ministries and Departments and public and private enterprises. Officers due to retire from the Defence Forces at an early age are screened by a high-power committee as well as by the Union Public Service Commission and those who come successfully through the screening process are offered to Ministries and Departments and the Planning Commission to fill suitable vacancies. A high-powered officer in Defence Headquarters has been placed on special duty to maintain the closest possible liaison with the Commission, Ministries and Departments, State Governments, and public and private enterprises.

Reorganization of the Rajasthan Secretariat

On the recommendation of a committee of Secretariat Officers, the Government of Rajasthan have announced a revised set-up of the Secretariat with effect from June 1, 1956. Under the new set-up, the number of clerks under the charge of a Superintendent has been reduced so that he can effectively supervise them, besides doing some noting and drafting work himself on more important cases. A new cadre of Assistants has been introduced who will submit papers direct to the Branch Officers instead of routing them through the Superintendent. These Assistants have been provided where the number of Upper Division dealing clerks exceeds five or where the nature of work is such that papers cannot be dealt with by an ordinary

U.D.C. The categories of Secretariat Officers have been limited to only three, viz., Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries.

Enhanced Financial Powers for the State Secretariat Administrative Departments

The Government of **Travancore-Cochin** have decided to delegate additional financial powers to the Secretariat Administrative Departments for the following purposes subject to budget provision : (i) sanction of purchases up to Rs. 25,000 ; (ii) non-recurring expenditure under 'contingencies' without limit; and (iii) creation of temporary non-gazetted posts for periods not exceeding six months, continuance beyond six months being sanctioned only with the concurrence of the Finance Department.

Larger Powers and Information Aides for District Collectors

The Government of **Travancore-Cochin** have decided to enhance substantially the powers and responsibilities of the District Collectors. They have been declared as Heads of the District Administrations. The Manuals of all Departments are accordingly being re-examined to incorporate the necessary changes.

With a view to keeping the Collectors in touch with the public opinion in the Districts in regard to the District Administration, an information section will be attached to them. The section will specially bring to their notice allegations made against the District Administration.

The State Government have also decided to push through vigorously the policy of delegation of greater powers to the Heads of Departments.

Organization and Methods Work in Punjab

Under the chairmanship of the Chief Secretary, the **Punjab** Government have set up a Committee of Administrative Secretaries which will look after the proper maintenance, operation and improvement of the administrative machine. The Committee has already held a number of meetings and made useful suggestions for disposal of work at various levels of authority.

Study Leave for State Officials

The **Mysore** Government have notified the grant of study leave concessions to their officials for training or study abroad in a number of subjects. These include, among others, public health, general administration, police administration and publicity.

Study of Public Administration at Osmania University

The **Osmania University** has started a two-year post-graduate diploma course and one year post-matriculate certificate course in Public Administration. The classes will be held in the evening. Sixty candidates, out of 200, who applied, have been selected for the two courses.

Seminar on Correctional Administration

A seminar on correctional administration was organized at Banaras under the auspices of the All India Crime Prevention Society from May 19 to 22, 1956. The Seminar recommended (1) preparation of comprehensive legislation based on the concept that a prisoner should be released as soon as he has been reformed and found fit to join society as a healthy member, and (2) the State should be responsible for sponsoring and developing after-care services which might be operated by Government and non-Government agencies or by both. These services should start immediately after the admission of the prisoner into jail and not when he is released.

Prison Reforms in U.P.

The U.P. Government have set up a Psychological Research and Help Section to evolve suitable psychological tests for different prisoners to enable the prison authorities to put each under proper correctional treatment. The Section is headed by a director and its staff includes an adviser, a consultant and two field psychologists. The State Government are also trying the scheme of open-air prison camps where convicts are given an opportunity to take part in development works.

II. FOREIGN

1. CANADA

Salary Increases for Civil Servants

As Civil Service salaries had fallen behind wage levels in private employment since the last general revision in December, 1953, the Canadian Government have announced a general upward revision with effect from April 1956. This revision is in compliance with the Government's policy that salary scales for the public service "should be adequate to attract and retain competent staff and should be comparable with those of good private employees." Increases are not uniform but vary according to the raises and benefits affecting each job classification during the period since the last salary range adjustments.

2. ITALY

Higher Council of Public Administration

By a decree issued by the Italian President, a Higher Council of Public Administration has been established as an advisory body to the Government in all matters of common interest relating to the organization, working and improvement of the Civil Services. This body, attached directly to the President, consists of 'ordinary' and 'extraordinary' members. The ordinary members are : one director generally from each ministry, four officials appointed by the President of the Council, the General Accountant of the State, two Councillors of State, two Councillors of the Court of Accounts, two Deputy State Attorneys-General, two university professors, and

fifteen Civil Servants (three each of the five classes) elected by a majority vote within each class. The 'extraordinary' members have a consultative status, viz. higher officials including the President of the National Institute for State Officials' Social Insurance and Assistance.

3. PAKISTAN

Reorganization of the Federal Government

The Government of Pakistan have set up a Federal Reorganization Committee to examine the impact of the Constitution on the functions and structure of the Federal Government with particular reference to the distribution of powers between the Centre and provinces and to further recommend changes necessary in the organization of the Federal Government.

4. UNITED KINGDOM

Reorganization of Local Government

A White Paper (Cmd. 9831) presented by the Minister of Housing and Local Government to the British Parliament in July 1956 outlines Government's new proposals for the reorganization of local government in England and Wales. It is proposed to set up two Local Government Commissions, one for England and the other for Wales. Their main task would be to make recommendations to the Minister in regard to the creation and extension of county boroughs, any necessary alterations in county boundaries, and the organization of local government in the conurbations. The first Commission will also go into the question of the reorganization of local authorities in Greater London. The Commissions will carry out such reviews as are found necessary.

At present, apart from reviews of county districts, there is no means of examining the organization of local government comprehensively over wide areas. For the creation of new county boroughs or the extension of existing ones, the only machinery available (except where the authorities concerned accept an extension by Order) is the promotion of a Private Bill. In practice, this has proved unsatisfactory, costly and often abortive. The White Paper points out that the new procedure which may be evolved as a result of the Commissions' recommendations should be designed to provide means for studying the problem comprehensively and for assessing the wider repercussions of proposed changes upon other authorities affected. It will enable local circumstances to be investigated and local opinion consulted. It will provide independent and informed guidance, while leaving to the Government and Parliament, the responsibility for ultimate decisions.

5. UNITED NATIONS

U.N. Salary Review Committee

The United Nations have set up a committee to undertake a comprehensive review of the United Nations' present system of salary, allowances and other benefits. The Committee consists of eleven experts from various

countries including two from Asia, namely Japan and India. A similar survey was conducted in 1949, and as a result of the experience gained, a fresh review has now been found necessary. The Committee is to report its findings and recommendations to the U. N. General Assembly at its eleventh session, scheduled to commence on the 11th November, 1956.

6. UNITED STATES

Changes in the Federal Retirement System

The Civil Service Retirement Act, 1930, was amended by Congress in July 1956. The important changes are : (1) an increase in employees' retirement deductions, (2) a more liberal formula for computing annuities, which will result in higher annuities for retiring employees and widows, (3) a lower reduction rate in annuities for retirement before the age of 60, (4) a minimum disability annuity, (5) higher children's annuities, (6) survivor annuities for dependent widowers, (7) refunds payable to separated employees with 20 or more years' service, and (8) no interest to accrue after December 31, 1956, on refunds to separated employees who have 5 or more years' civilian service. The amended provisions would come into force with effect from October 1, 1956.

Scope for "Juniors" to compete for Jobs in the New York State Service

The State of New York has broadened its programme for recruiting college graduates into State employment. "Juniors", *i.e.* students in the third year of the college, can take an examination designed to select 'eligibles' for many entrance-level professional and technical positions. Appointments would, however, be made effective only after the candidates' graduation from the college.

Study of Expenses on Job Transfers

The U.S. Civil Service Commission, through an interagency advisory committee, have undertaken a study of the loss of money to the Government employees arising from their transfer to different localities. If the study reveals that the present schedule of reimbursing employees for the expense of moving is insufficient, the Commission propose to introduce legislation to authorise additional reimbursement. At present, the Government are not paying for the following expenses which are usually incurred by the employees on their transfer : (i) cost of family meals and lodging while *en route* to the new station of duty; (ii) employee's expenses in new location prior to move of the family; and (iii) settling expenses in new location such as broker's fees, school registration or book fees and new driver's licence fees.

A recent survey by the American Management Association revealed that private industry in the U.S.A. currently reimburses for part or all of the above expenses in the majority of cases.

Digest of Reports

INDIA. CABINET SECRETARIAT. O. & M. DIVISION. RE-EXAMINATION OF INDIA'S ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT'S INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES; BY PAUL H. APPLEBY. *Delhi, Manager of Publications, Aug. 1956. 59p.*

The recommendations made by Mr. Appleby in his report may be, for purposes of analysis, divided into two parts : (I) general observations which apply both to traditional forms of administration and public enterprises, and (II) specific proposals in regard to Government's Industrial and Commercial Enterprises.

At the beginning of his report, Mr. Appleby has especially pointed out : "Here many vigorous and harsh things will be said. They do not reflect any general, adverse judgment about what is going on here. They are not criticisms which should be publicly made or publicly discussed. They constitute an intra-organizational discussion of essentially technical sort. For those not experienced in and responsibly associated with governmental administration their effect may be largely contrary to their intent."

The important recommendations made by Mr. Appleby are given below, in his own words :

I. General Observations

(a) *The Indian Administrative System*

1. The great achievements of recent years have been made beyond the capacity of the Indian administrative system. By working key personnel very excessive hours, by giving special attention to a very disproportionate number of transactions, by stubborn persistence of programmatic officials in the face of frustration, great results have been achieved. There is an early limit, however, to what may be done in this fashion. It puts too much reliance on a very small number of individuals, whereas for a much larger achievement reliance must be on a greatly improved organizational performance of systematic character.

2. A general fault of the Indian administrative process exists in the practice of seeking agreement on everything by everybody before anything is done. Worse, the practice requires that these agreements cover not only general objectives, general allocations of funds, general personnel arrangements, and the fixing of general lines of responsibility, but also cover specific applications of these general determinations in a continuing and heavy flow. There is much too much sharing of responsibility for action before the fact, and too little review in appropriate terms focussing on accomplishment after the fact.

By a curious proliferation of the conceptions of parliamentary responsibility and Cabinet responsibility and by reliance on excessive

procedures of cross-reference there has been built an extraordinary evasion of individual responsibility and a system whereby everybody is responsible for everything before anything is done.

3. Granted prior agreement in principle on kind and dimension of program to be undertaken and the amount of money to be made available for the purpose, specific decisions incident to effectuation of purpose in India are reviewed by too many persons in too many organs of the government in too detailed, too repetitive and too negative terms. Perhaps nowhere else have so many systematic barriers been erected to prevent the accomplishment of that which it has been determined should be done.

4. Near the heart of the problem is a failure to realize and understand that the government of India—Centre, State, municipal and rural—will and must grow greatly and rapidly in size, and that this growth compels changes in procedures of a sort directly related to size of government. Where here the thinking is big about social objectives, the thinking is small about the government whose great increase in size is essential to the effectuation of the great purposes.

It is of the highest importance here that all leaders, in party, parliament and private life understand that the government must grow rapidly in size—in numbers employed and in annual costs—and that this growth will be greater than, not less than, the estimate it is thought acceptable to publish. The phenomenon is one of a geometrical progression.

(b) *Administrative Requirements of Bigger Government*

Once it is fully realized that the rapid enlargement of government is a basic essential, the necessities may be listed as follows :

1. Provide structurally for new levels of coordination of larger and larger areas of interrelated undertakings, below the level of Cabinet and below the level of Minister.

2. Cultivate growth capacity by structural and procedural arrangements.

3. Generally reorient the present practices of review from a preponderantly negative concern for precedent and rupee-pinching to a positive one of expeditious action in pursuit of agreed-upon objectives.

4. Great enlargement in recruitment and training plans for generalist administrator and technical-administrator personnel.

(c) *Structural and Procedural Changes Required to Promote Potentiality for Expansion and to Provide for New Levels of Coordination of Larger Areas of Related Administrations :*

1. There are great variations in the capacity of various parts of a government to expand. Hierarchical structures should be determined with considerations of future growth in mind. In general, a large and effective organization can accept and conduct effectively a new assignment requiring additional structural arrangements and additional personnel more rapidly

than a wholly new organization; however, it is less certain that this organization will perform its new duties well. There will also be some tendency for the new function to take second place in an old organization. Novelty of function and urgency of its need may dictate the establishment of a new organization for the purpose. The choice almost certainly will be more costly, in terms of money, than the cost that would accrue by giving the assignment to an old organization. But in the larger sense of social need, this larger cost may represent true economy. In time, the total consequence, if uncorrected, will certainly be a total proliferation of special organizations within the government of such numbers and variety as to be unmanageable by government. It follows that in every marginal judgment, choice of expansion method should be in favour of expanding a going organization. It further follows that through the years to come there should be persistent movement of consolidation of the special organizations according to some schemes of "coherent missions".

2. Of major importance is the achievement of a structure which is in fact manageable by the respective ministers and by the Cabinet as a body. This means that there must be extensive delegation, an elevation of review procedures that will concentrate on concerns really important at high levels, and the use of new subordinate coordinating and expeditor mechanisms. To effect the higher elevation necessary to the management of more and more complex business, a legislative body, a chief executive, a minister or any subordinate official must exercise organizational skill and achieve a mental reorientation. It is only by development of competence below, and exercise of skill in utilization of subordinate abilities, that high responsibilities may be upheld.

The sequel to delegation, of course, is the development of techniques for review and control of that which is delegated. Delegation is not abdication of responsibility; it is an enlargement of it. Inquiries into what has been done and what is being done, on a sampling basis, replace examination of everything proposed to be done. Field trips and letters of inquiry and complaints provide supplemental insights.

3. Considerations of future growth require a widening and deepening of hierarchies, and in higher levels a progressive diminution in the importance of professional and technical qualifications and distinctions. More basic is the fact that room must be made for the insertion into hierarchy of new levels to take care of new functions and to receive more and more delegations of responsibility. What is needed, in other words, is an improvement in hierarchies. Improvement in the amount of work is one objective; better quality of work is another; expansibility is another; capacity to delegate is still another.

4. An official of high stature should be designated in the Cabinet Secretariat as Programme Expediter or Plan Expediter, given strong Cabinet support and provided with sufficient staff of maturity and status to enable him to serve as procedure reformer and structural adviser.

(d) Review Methods and Procedures

1. The drive to expand and to fulfil Plan objectives is extraordinarily confined to programmatic agencies, while the long established practices

of review in Finance, in Home Affairs, in the activities of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, in Parliamentary committees and in too frequent references to ministers and cabinets, are definitely hostile to governmental expansion and program achievement. The result is general delay, frustration and confusion.

2. Far too many proposed actions are reviewed, and the review is far too often in a useless, petty, and frustrating fashion. All proposed transactions which come up for review are referred downward to very subordinate staff who have no experience of or knowledge of the kind of project being dealt with. This excessive concern for precedent encourages in subordinates a negative and timid attitude.

3. The present method of expenditures control conceals a serious inadequacy in the development of the government's budget. The expenditures control is used to far too great an extent as a substitute for good budgeting. The budget is being made all year long for the year rapidly marching toward its close. "Schemes" or projects of various kinds are presented to the Finance Ministry throughout the year, some for early clearance and apportionment of funds, some as a hostage to later budgets. These schemes are usually not much more than policy ideas; they are almost never actual administrative and expenditure projections ready for serious consideration as such. The ministries, knowing that Finance will reduce their request, are given to loose and extravagant estimates of cost. The whole system establishes a pattern of poor cost estimates and poor budgeting which, in turn, are justifications for detailed financial intervention. Detailed expenditure control after the fact of general determination has the effect of delaying, frustrating and even nullifying decisions made earlier at the highest levels. It has the character of a vicious circle in which exclusive reliance on Finance, and in less degree of Home Affairs, has prevented the program ministries from developing a competence in the translation of technical schemes into sound and convincing budgetary and expenditure proposals.

4. The only systematic attention given to expenditures is the negative attention of a review designed to effect economy. Far too little and too imprecise planning is done to make expenditures actually equate with program. To remedy this situation requires close, continuing study of expenditures, careful and frequently modified projection of expenditures, and changes in action indicated by those projections. The Ministry of Finance needs to shift more of its attention to better budgeting and away from detailed expenditures control after budgeting.

5. The government needs to fix positive responsibilities in reviewing agencies now exercising principally negative influences. What is needed is the development of financial and budgetary competence within the parent ministries and under the managing directors of public enterprises, in personnel responsible to them. An adequate office for business management should be set up in every ministry and in every attached operating organization which would develop and maintain accounts necessary to administrative control, formulate valid and defensible budget estimates, and keep expenditures within the limits of appropriations. Each such office should be clothed with prestige, reporting directly to the Secretary or to the Managing Director as the case may be, and competently equipped with personnel. Out of such

functions the office will be enabled to develop departmental and ministerial budgets of a quality requiring a minimum of critical review and permitting the Finance Ministry to make its decisions in terms of its special competence—the availability of funds altogether in view of the total demand upon funds. Departmental budgets would then be subject to reduction almost exclusively in terms of competing needs of other ministries and agencies. Under the reformed system, the Finance Ministry could properly make large lump sum allocations of the funds appropriated by Parliament instead of making innumerable small releases. Varying percentages, relatively small, of funds appropriated to the ministries could be kept in reserve.

6. All review functions are high-level functions and must be performed in high-level terms. Review should be limited in volume to what a relatively small staff of high-calibre qualifications can handle. Reviewing agencies should have a higher proportion of high-ranking, high-paid officials than do operating agencies.

7. An official of stature should be appointed in the Ministry of Finance to serve as a specialist to the Expenditure Secretary. His main function would be accelerate decision making in the Finance Ministry.

8. Auditing has two purposes : (1) to insure propriety in the sense of quite precise adherence to established practices and standards in monetary transactions, and (2) to provide an independent appraisal of the assets and liabilities of the organization which can certify as to the over-all financial status of the undertaking.

There is at present, a greatly exaggerated notion of the importance of auditing. Audit by the Comptroller and Auditor-General, in its present form, increases the timidity of public servants at all levels, making them unwilling to take responsibility for decisions, forcing decisions to be made by a slow and cumbersome process of reference and conference in which every body finally shares dimly in the making of every decision, not enough gets done and what gets done is done too slowly.

The Comptroller and Auditor-General's function is not really a very important one. Auditors don't know, and can't be expected to know, very much about good administration; their prestige is highest with others who don't know much about administration. What auditors know is auditing—which is not administration; it is a necessary but highly pedestrian function with a narrow perspective and very limited usefulness. Any deputy secretary knows vastly more about significant problems in his ministry than the entire staff of the Comptroller and Auditor-General can discover by auditing. In close observation of various governments during many years the writer has never known of a really important insight produced by governmental comptrollers. Yet here the Comptroller and Auditor-General's reports presume to speak as an authority on administration in general. They even presume to speak on the programmatic values of the various undertakings. Parliamentary members take such things seriously as providing a sensible basis for discussing important problems without even securing advice from the ministerial officials who know vastly more about them. Formal reports on finance are made without consulting a single Finance official.

Further, the function of auditing is a strictly negative one. Parliament's most important concern should be with the positive attainment of

program objectives the legislative body has espoused. Instead of helping Parliament arrive at general judgments about the ministries and attached organizations and a general appraisal of the way in which social objectives are being attained, audit reports focus Parliamentary attention on little things. This demeans Parliament.

(e) Recruitment and Training

1. There is here, and will long be, a great shortage of personnel sufficiently competent to fill the hundreds and hundreds of key positions necessary to effective government pursuing the goal of a Welfare State speedily attained. The needs will be great in both the private and the public sectors, but the public needs will be central and primary, limiting the capacity of the government to grow, and therefore limiting its capacity to achieve. There is too much unwillingness to recruit in sufficient numbers, even for present needs, and too little realization that future needs of far more serious dimensions cannot be met in the future except by additional recruitment and training now.

2. The absurd limitation of selection of a new appointee to a single individual certified by the Public Service Commission in the mistaken belief that it strengthens the merit system, really hampers proper selection by ignoring differences in individuals important to different kinds of positions, and reduces the probability that a needed person can be immediately engaged. There is need for a shift to a system of certification of eligibility which produces a maximum number of persons for the many kinds of positions needing to be filled, in lists determined well in advance of needs from which appointments may be made with much more discretion and expedition than now is possible. The maintenance of standing register of eligibles would make appointment expeditious. The persons capable of serving well at high levels are rare birds; they must be sought wherever they may be found, and developed by various means.

3. The existing pattern of job-titles and the rigidities of class, service, cadre, and grade pay differentials are all confining and, therefore, hostile to rapid growth. There is need for competition for promotion and flexibility in the making of promotions instead of protecting "rights" of small numbers. Cadre plans now being approved should be early enlarged so as more adequately to meet the needs.

4. Full use should be made of sub-professionals. Fully trained professionals waste their time doing things persons with much less training could do as well.

5. There are, at present, too definite and inadequate notions about entrance salaries so that many qualified persons are not attracted to the public service. The present attitudes toward pay for public service as an aspect of the eternal search for small savings is a serious deterrent to the dynamic and truly efficient government which is a crucially imperative here. The time consumed in the present laborious methods of doing business entails a waste vastly greater than the savings of the present emphasis on small "economies". Morale of public personnel is deteriorating before repeated Parliamentary proposals to reduce pay. In the long run India will get in administration only what she pays for and what she provides scope for.

In their own interest, the people must be willing to pay what adequate and successful government will cost.

II

Administration of State Industrial and Commercial Enterprises

1. The success of the State Industrial and Commercial enterprises depends upon rapid decision-making, rapid action. There is special validity particularly in India and particularly just now, in the application of the conception of autonomy to the government's industrial and commercial undertakings. To change administrative practices in this single area is easier than to effect a thorough-going, government-wide change. True autonomy is out of the question and not seriously proposed by any informed person. In democracy, government can always and should always be able to intervene in any matter really important to the government. As it is, there is no danger whatever that grants of power to Indian enterprises will be too great. On the contrary, the danger is that the government and Parliament will be much too fearful and will grant insufficient "autonomy". In the early days of a new enterprise the responsible Minister will need to give much more careful and relatively detailed attention to an enterprise than he will when its functioning is well established.

2. Up to now the tendency seems to have been to establish more separate enterprises than appears wise. In the long run governmental and Parliamentary responsibilities will be best served when the total number of enterprises separately managed will be relatively small so that the government can deal principally with consolidated reports, leaving more detailed scrutiny to those instances in which the consolidated reports seem to indicate the need. Under a theory of "coherent missions" every opportunity to substitute enlargement and consolidation for the establishment of a new and separate enterprise should be seized.

3. There is no magic in a board of directors, and none in the word "corporation" or "company". The earliest, and everywhere highly successful public enterprises have been the postal services, which are quite uniformly structured along the lines of what here would be called executive ministries. The decision whether to establish a corporation or a company or an executive ministry is not a fundamental and determining one. Solutions appropriate here must be developed by Indians, in terms of the Indian context and very much in terms of the Indian urgency.

4. Ablest men available should be found for the posts of Managing Directors. It must not, however, be forgotten that the ablest general administrators and those most attuned to public responsibility now will generally, but not always, be civil servants. There is a mistaken belief that it is, in principle, necessary or desirable to include private persons on boards of directors. Officials representing ministries concerned who are appointed to the boards too often are without real authority to speak for their ministries. The boards should be chiefly coordinating mechanisms.

Membership on boards should be determined with these two primary functions in mind. In general, board membership should be confined to the Managing Director and (in the case of large enterprises) his two principal deputies, and to high officials in other enterprises or in ministries normally having related, supervising or coordinating interests. In effect, the boards

should be organs of governmental coordination, the members definitely empowered to speak for their respective ministries and capable of judging which matters should, in spite of delegation, be referred to higher authority. The appointment of private persons should be generally avoided. They should be put in third levels of the corporate hierarchies as Shop and Plant Managers. Where desirable persons with special qualifications should be used as special consultants or experts.

5. Boards themselves must delegate greatly to the Managing Director, and he to his subordinates. Functions reserved by the boards should be primarily — and particularly once the organization has got under way—two : (1) the development of reports as bases for making intelligent over-all appraisals of the effectiveness of the organization; and (2) the making of decisions which in their nature require consideration of the functions and responsibilities of other enterprises or ministries. It is often forgotten here that nothing happens in action toward the attainment of the objectives of the enterprises except as persons actively engaged in producing their product are freed to act with confidence and expedition. A pattern of large delegation at the top would encourage delegation at every level below. In the long run, much important work and many decisions must be delegated by the Boards to levels far from the top hierarchial posts. In number, at least 90 per cent. of the decisions necessary to the conduct of a large enterprise should be made below the level of the Managing Director.

6. The government must have a policy about remuneration in public enterprises; there must be some capacity to relate remuneration patterns so that they may be generally explained and defended. Yet the governmental policy concerning remuneration may be flexible, and it may be experimental. When a private company is taken over by the government, and the top salaries previously paid in that company have been substantially higher than that of top civil servants, it is likely to lead only to failure if an effort is made to impose the present, normal governmental pay scales on this enterprise. Pay differentials should be thought of wholly as instruments of effectiveness. The bonus plans partly introduced here in the government printing plants and in the railways afford single, but insufficient, examples of the effective use of incentives in association with intelligent managerial study. And beyond financial incentives, of course, more attention should be given here to the incentive to earn public approbation.

7. Auditing in the case of industrial and commercial enterprises operated by the government should be done by private auditing firms. The Comptroller and Auditor-General is otherwise oriented and too independent, and therefore too little enabled to adjust his approach to many different kinds of operations.

8. Much domestic purchasing of most of the enterprises should be done independently. A sufficient safeguard would be a requirement that all purchases made other than from low bidders would be given detailed justification to the head of directors.

III

(a) *Relations between Administration and Parliament*

1. At every higher level in a hierarchial structure decisions tend to be more and more general and have more and more to do with manner and

direction of action rather than with precise control of specific actions. The fundamental role of legislatures as representatives of the people is to choose leadership which is to be responsible for the more precise and specific decisions and the management of the process by which such decisions are made, and the choice of direction in which the leadership is to be confined.

2. In its approach to the consideration of particular controls, the performance of Parliament is as lacking as it is distinguished in dealing with major policy. It greatly aggravates an already excessive tendency in the bureaucracy to avoid taking responsibility for decisions and going ahead to get things done. This negative approach to administration has retarded action and made achievement difficult.

3. (i) The members of Parliament greatly exaggerate the importance of the function of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, and pay far too much attention to his reports. Audit reports focus Parliamentary attention on little things. Parliament's most important concerns should be with the positive attainment of program objectives the legislative body has espoused.

(ii) There is among members of Parliament too much general and vague fear that its responsibilities are not being preserved.

(iii) The Parliament often exhibits a prejudice, anomalous in India in 1956, for reliance on the judgment of business men. The worst failures in the U.S.A. government have been business and industrial leaders put into responsible public posts.

(iv) Parliament here seems strangely inclined to make too ready concessions to some of the self-interest demands of small but influential business interests, and to enforce corresponding changes in Government's decisions.

(v) Parliament's endorsement of the formerly small and narrow approach of the Public Service Commission to its own functions in the mistaken belief that this strengthens the merit system undermines the responsibility of the ministries and thereby undermines the responsibility of Parliament. Parliament should be concerned with the identification of much larger groups of eligibles and providing for selection for particular posts by the employing agency.

(vi) Parliament's reluctance to delegate its powers in detail, as it is essential to do if Parliamentary powers are to be important and positive, discourages Ministers from delegating their powers, discourages Secretaries from delegating their powers, and Managing Directors from delegating their powers.

4. Unless this Parliament accommodates itself to the needs for large action and elevates its own approach to affairs to the appropriate high level of general direction, India's future will be precarious. Parliament needs to become sensitive to the necessity of operating on a high level. In respect of administration it almost uniformly functions on a low level. The simplest way in which Parliament could reverse its influence on administration from a negative one to a positive one would be for it to stop looking for things to criticise and to begin looking for things to praise. What is needed here is a heightened recognition of the utter dependence of Parliament upon Administration for any actual achievement of its own purposes.

(b) *Planning Commission*

1. Planning is an important part of administrative policy-making

and not something done in the political and administrative vacuum so usually the resort of professional planners.

2. The Commission should avoid developing too large and complex an organization of its own, attempting to become "expert" in program fields or in its own general character, and becoming involved in a type of program review and control. Its administrative role should continue to be a general one with heavy policy content and otherwise for the most part influential in the making of helpful general administrative arrangements.

3. The Commission should continue to make, or have to be made, such evaluating studies as may seem to be required, but such studies should be made by persons experienced in public program administration and not by those who are only qualified academically.

RAJASTHAN ADMINISTRATIVE ENQUIRY COMMITTEE, 1955.

Jaipur, Government of Rajasthan, 1956. iii, 66p.

The Committee was appointed in 1955 by the Rajasthan Government under the chairmanship of the Chief Secretary to examine all aspects of administration with a view to successfully meeting the increased demands which the Second Five Year Plan would make on administration. The major recommendations of the Committee are as follows :

1. *Tehsils and Collectorates* : Every tehsil must have at least one Naib-Tehsildar under the Tehsildar. The present staff in collectorates is quite inadequate to carry out the enormous responsibilities which may devolve upon them in the next few years. Six additional posts of collectors should be created and the ministerial staff augmented.

At the moment the Tehsildar besides doing his own work looks after the development works also. These two functions should be separated.

2. *National Extension Service* : Separate posts of Block Development Officers should be created and manned by internal deputation from the existing cadres both of Tehsildars and Extension Officers, and even from the cadres of the Rajasthan Administrative Service and the Indian Administrative Service, if required.
3. *Technical Departments and their Administration* : Having accepted the principle that the Secretariat should exclusively retain the right of policy formation and general direction of administration, it follows that there is no justification whatever for general administrators to act as Heads of Technical Departments. Wherever such position exists, technical men may be forthwith recruited.
4. *Planning and Development Department* : (i) In view of the vast magnitude of Community Development work, the Departments of Agriculture, Irrigation, Animal Husbandry, Co-operation and Social Welfare should be transferred to another whole-time Secretary to Government. The Public Relations Directorate should be transferred to the Planning Department. (ii) While annual plans should be specific and entail definite commitments, plans for later years within a five-year period should be in more

general terms so as to avoid undue rigidity in implementation. (iii) Systematic evaluation should become a normal administrative practice in all branches of public activity in the State. In place of an Assistant Secretary proposed by the Planning Department, a Research Officer should be posted with the Planning Commission, who should, besides making a periodic survey of the lay-out of the State budget, will also act as Secretary to the Evaluation Organisation.

5. *Secretariat* : (i) The strength of staff at the Secretariat should be increased by approximately 10% on an *ad hoc* basis. (ii) In a department like the Finance, elaborate noting by the subordinate staff should be discouraged. The Office Superintendent should not merely be a supervisor but also do noting on the files. Factual noting on technical aspects should be recorded by the subordinate personnel but financial scrutiny of proposals should take place at officers' level. (iii) The size of the sections should be small. A section should not ordinarily have more than 5 dealing Assistants. (iv) The post of Assistant Secretary provides the first disposing stage in the Secretariat. Unlike the Government of India, an Office Superintendent in the State Secretariat is not a disposing Officer. In order to relieve the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of routine papers, considerable delegation of powers will have to be made to the Assistant Secretary. One of the principal steps of improving the work at the Secretariat would be to post Junior I. A. S. and R.A.S. Officers for short periods. Such postings will bring some fresh air into the Secretariat and provide adequate personnel at the first stage of examination of office files. Therefore from among the present Assistant Secretaries those considered suitable should be selected into the R.A.S. (v) The Assistant Secretary should be properly trained to ensure that he is fully equipped to see that the file going up has been adequately scrutinised from the financial angle. During the Second Plan period two temporary posts of Assistant Secretaries may be created for the purpose of training in the Finance Department. The training should cover a period of four months and approximately 30 Assistant Secretaries should be trained during the next five years in the Finance Department. (vi) The work of some Secretariat Officers, specially those in Transport, Revenue and Relief and Rehabilitation Departments, can be made much lighter if the tendency to hear appeals at the Secretariat level is vigorously checked. There should be an immediate re-examination of the matter of hearing appeals by the Law Department which should see that as far as possible the Board of Revenue or Commissions are more and more utilised for appellate work and that the Secretariat is divested of this unnecessary distraction.
6. *Recruitment, Training, etc.* : (i) In case a separate cadre of Block Development Officers to be staffed by internal deputation is constituted then provision must be made for promotion of the certain percentage of B.D.O.s to the R.A.S. The issue of special recruitment to the R.T.S. cadre should be examined as the programmes of development, consolidation of holdings and colonisation are likely to make great demands on this cadre of officers. (ii) A Revenue Training School, something on the lines of a Police

Training College, should be set up to train *Qanungos*, *Naib Tehsildars* and special recruits to the R.A.S. For promotion to the post of a Sub-Divisional Officer, a period of attachment of the R.A.S. Officers with the Settlement Commissioner or with the Director of Consolidation should be made obligatory. (iii) The Officers at the higher level should not order transfer, without prior consultation with the officers concerned on or from which transfer is proposed. In regard to the developmental programmes the officers should not be removed frequently from their posts without special reasons.

7. *Local Government Service* : The Government should seriously consider the creation of a Local Government Service. At present the personnel standards among the different local bodies are uneven and no constant effort is made by Local authorities as a whole to secure the best persons for their services and to make the best use of them. There should be a cadre or different cadres of Local Government employees. These cadres will include engineers, public health officers, medical practitioners and general administrators. Furthermore, if the service under Local Bodies is to secure the right type of entrants, its service conditions must be sufficiently attractive.

ESTIMATES COMMITTEE, 31st Report (Ministry of Railways—Finance and Accounts). *New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1956, iii, 59p.*

The Report describes very briefly the functions and the organisational set-up of the Railway Accounts Department and then examines in detail the present purpose and methods of control over expenditure, the general pattern of the accounts structure and costing in workshops. The major recommendations made in these matters, in short, are :

(1) The Purpose and Methods of Financial Control

- (a) The procedure adopted for the control of expenditure on the Railways is unsatisfactory and requires improvement. In respect of revenue expenditure, the scrutiny of the money spent and control are at present limited to seeing that the budget allotments are not exceeded, that the expenditure has been properly sanctioned and that the canons of financial propriety are observed. Control is, therefore, exercised largely with a view to fulfilling the requirements of Appropriation Audit.

The expenditure actually incurred is not correlated to performance and scrutiny and control are not exercised so as to see whether an increase or decrease in expenditure is correspondingly reflected in the related performance. The services rendered by the Railways, namely transport, have a commercial value, and are measurable in quantitative terms. Moreover, the Railways earn a revenue directly related to the quantum of the services. The Railway expenditure should therefore be controlled with reference to performance also. Managerial control would reveal wastage and inefficiency and also help in flexible adjustment of expenditure, almost simultaneously, to changes in performance. Managerial control should be adopted not as a substitute for but as a supplement to the existing system of Appropriation Audit

which will have to continue so long as the present form of Budget continues.

- (b) The first requirement of an efficient system of managerial control is a satisfactory system for analysing and compiling the various statistics of performance. A correlation of the expenditure with performance is the next step. A mere comparison of the total expenses under any particular head either of the various units for the same period or of the same unit for different periods serves no useful purpose, since these expenses are affected by many varying factors. All expenditure should, as far as possible, be expressed in terms of cost per unit of service.
- (c) The present statistics comparing expenditure with performance are insufficient for an effective review since they are compiled for the Zonal Railways as a whole. Therefore, unless attention is given to performance at all levels including the lowest level, review at the highest level by itself would be practically useless.

(2) Refinement of Accounting Techniques

- (a) Before the Railways are faced with competition from other modes of transport they ought to set about reorganising the techniques of their accounting and to adapt the modern refinements to the extent suitable to their conditions of working. A procedure should be worked out by an experienced Accounts Officer to carry out the necessary refinements in accounting techniques. This would not involve a conflict with the present requirements of Appropriation Audit. The changes necessitated by application of modern Cost Accounting ideas can well be undertaken along with the present forms of accounting until such time as it may be found to be possible to modify the latter also.
- (b) There is no reason why information regarding anticipations of performance should not find a place in the Explanatory Memoranda even now, when such information is utilised to a large extent in framing budget. The periods covered in the Explanatory Memoranda should be increased so that the trends of expenditure over a longer period under the Demands and their Sub-Heads are readily available for comparison purposes. The number of years preceding the year under review to be covered in the Memorandum, should be at least five.

(3) Offices of the Financial Adviser and Chief Accounts Officer

The wisdom of placing the entire burden of compiling the accounts, framing the budget and rendering financial advice on a single office is open to doubt. The functions at present attached to the office of the Financial Adviser and Chief Accounts Officer should be bifurcated, and there should be two separate Heads of Departments; the Chief Accounts Officer being concerned only with the compilation of accounts and for effecting the necessary check on the receipts and expenditure, etc. and the Financial Adviser with the prompt compilation of budget, making available financial advice to administration, close control and review of expenditure, and the application of improved techniques and introduction of changes in forms and procedure pertaining to accounting and finance, etc.

(4) Costing in Workshop

- (a) The costs of operation in certain workshops are less than elsewhere. Advantage of this lower cost of production should be taken by undertaking work for other Zonal Railways in these workshops, wherever possible.
- (b) There is at present no uniformity in the statistics regarding performance maintained in the various workshops, and full use is not being made of the information that is available. A detailed comparative examination of the statistics can lead to effective economies and increased efficiency. In addition to the present budgetary appropriation control, expenditure in workshops should also in future be subjected regularly to performance control, and the results for each of the major workshops indicated in the various individual Administration Reports. A general survey should also be included in the Railway Board's Annual Report.
- (c) The extent to which the installation of additional machinery has increased the output, efficiency and capacity of the particular machinery as well as of the workshop as a whole should be constantly watched. The results of such a comparison should also be indicated in the various Administration Reports for each of the workshops.

ESTIMATES COMMITTEE, 24th Report (Ministry of Railways—Staff Matters). *New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat. 1955, vi, 87p.*

The Indian Railways constitute the largest nationalised undertaking in the country. The Report indicates that the total number of staff employed on the 31st March, 1955 was 9,80,207, distributed as follows : (i) Class I & II : 2,616, (ii) Class III; 3,52,428, and (iii) Class IV : 6,25,163.

The main recommendations of the Committee are summarised below :

(1) Recruitment

- (a) The Railways should plan in advance their requirements of the staff for at least six months and should furnish the same to the Railway Service Commissions at fixed intervals leaving sufficient margin of time for the Commissions to plan their selections. The Railway Service Commissions should hold combined tests for a number of categories of Railway services, which would save considerable time and energy and expedite the process of recruitment.
- (b) Psychological tests should gradually be introduced to find out the aptitude of candidates for different types of jobs. This will prevent the possibility of putting square pegs in round holes and improve the tone of administration. The present method of recruiting certain categories of staff such as Office Clerks and Typists only by written test and without an interview should be discontinued. An interview of the candidates to form an idea of the personality and capacity to express themselves is very much necessary. For jobs relating to welfare of labour and educational and social activities, those who have had training or experience in the field should be given due consideration.

- (c) The procedure followed by the Railway Service Commissions in selecting candidates for the written tests and interviews should be given wide publicity and the results of examinations should be freely published in the newspapers. The various stages leading to final selection of candidates against a post should be made clear in the application form. The Railway Ministry should include a detailed review of the activities of the Railway Service Commissions in their Annual Reports.
- (d) (i) The existing Railway Service Commissions with one Chairman and one Member are not adequate to deal with the expected volume of work of recruitment efficiently and expeditiously. The Railway Ministry should take steps to set up one Railway Service Commission for each Zone. The additional expenditure to be incurred on the Railway Service Commissions will be more than compensated by increased efficiency, avoidance of delay in supply of staff to the Railways and the increased facilities afforded to the candidates in each Zone. (ii) The Headquarters of the Commission need not necessarily be situated at the Headquarters of the Railway Zone. It would be a distinct advantage from the point of view of economy and facilities to the candidates, to locate the Headquarters at a comparatively smaller and more centrally situated place. (iii) The posts of the Secretary of each of the Commissions should be a senior scale post with a tenure of three years and Personnel Officers of the Railway concerned should be considered for it. The question of direct recruitment to the posts should also be examined.
- (e) The number of women workers on the Railways is small. The reasons for wide fluctuations in the number of women employed should be examined and necessary steps taken to recruit more women to jobs which by the nature of their duties are more suited to them, such as those in the catering department. In the advertisements for such jobs, it should be clearly stated that women are eligible to apply.
- (f) Greater publicity should be given by advertisements in local papers, notices at stations, etc., to recruitment to different categories of Class IV staff (including trade apprentices), than is being done hitherto.

(2) Training

- (a) The activities at the Staff College, Baroda, should be extended to provide for the training of probationary officers, systematic refresher courses for junior officers and special courses for the senior officers. The syllabi of the training courses should also be improved. The duration of instruction for each item should also be fixed after a careful scrutiny. Study tours by officers of one Zone to other Zones should be encouraged to promote imbibing of fresh ideas and better understanding of the working of railway administration in different zones.

- (b) The existing training facilities for initial training and refresher courses are inadequate. A Committee of educationists should carefully assess the requirements of training facilities for each Railway and make recommendations on the question of opening of new training schools and the standardisation of the syllabi of training and refresher courses for different categories of staff.
- (c) Training facilities should exist for all categories of workers including unskilled ones. The possibility of encouraging private institutions for giving particular kind of training, required for the different categories of Railway employees should be explored by the Railway Ministry.
- (d) Literacy in regional language should be insisted on at the time of recruitment of Class IV staff. For the illiterate members of this Class already in service, a scheme of paying lump sum literacy bonus for the acquisition of literacy and of providing simple and interesting literature may be formulated.
- (e) In order to overcome the shortage of trained personnel, the question of giving extension of service to experienced personnel as also of re-employing the retired hands should be considered by the Railway Ministry.

(3) Promotion Policy

- (a) The Railways should forecast the number of people required for different posts to make the employees realise that opportunities are open to them for furthering their prospects, if they equip themselves properly. Further, the avenues of promotion in various Departments should be clearly laid down and made known to the staff. The seniority lists of staff should be expeditiously finalised and circulated amongst them, so that they can form an idea about their prospects of promotion. Promotion policy should also be closely coordinated with suitable training.
- (b) Definite standards of efficiency which must be attained by the junior scale officers before being promoted to the senior scale, should be laid down. Junior scale posts should really be the training ground for future holders of senior scale and administrative posts. For first promotion to senior scale, junior scale officers should be interviewed by a Board of three Heads of Departments.
- (c) Promotion of Class II officers could not be given regularly to the prescribed quota prior to 1952-53. Arrear promotions should be brought up to the quota reserved. Unlike some other Government Departments, the Railways do not make any direct recruitment to Class II service. This undoubtedly gives better opportunities to the Class III employees to show their merit and secure promotion to gazetted posts. But there is considerable difference in the nature of work handled by Class III and Class II staff. It

is, therefore, necessary to lay down sufficiently high standards for selection to Class II service. If Class III staff of the requisite standards are not available, direct recruitment to Class II service may be considered.

- (d) Confirmation of staff officiating against temporary posts is often considerably delayed. All cases of officers and staff officiating in the higher posts for more than five years should be reviewed periodically, and orders of confirmation issued expeditiously.

(4) Efficiency of Staff

- (a) Each Railway should evolve the system of piecework rating and bonuses in its workshops and the co-operation of the National Federation of Indian Railwaymen should be sought in this matter to implement the scheme as early as possible.
- (b) (i) The Staff Suggestions Scheme may be made more popular amongst the staff by giving it a wide publicity in regional languages. Staff in the lowest categories should also be encouraged to offer suggestions. (ii) Promotion and increase in salary, stipends to children for study, and stipends to the inventors for further study in India and abroad may yield useful results. (iii) Cases of exceptional and outstanding work should receive special recognition by payments of honoraria, letters of appreciation and medals. (iv) A committee of two or three General Managers should be asked to evolve a suitable scheme to determine the criteria for the award of the proposed 'Efficiency Shield'.
- (c) Concrete steps should be taken by the Railway Ministry to enlist the cooperation of the Employees' Unions at all levels, especially to popularise the Plan and arouse enthusiasm of the staff for its proper implementation. Similarly, public co-operation should be enlisted for this purpose by publicity and propaganda.
- (d) A proper machinery of Job-analysis should be introduced on each Railway. The question of setting up a Job-analysis wing in the Efficiency Bureau in the Railway Board's Office to direct and control the Job-analysis machinery on the individual Railways may also be examined.

(5) Discipline

- (a) The problem of the Railway employees approaching outside agencies for assistance, has two aspects, namely : (i) employees feel that through normal channel, there is never any possibility of getting justice; and (ii) employees bring to bear outside influence on matters, which should be left to be settled through normal channels. Both these aspects should be dispassionately studied and a solution found out to ensure that the sense of security and justice prevails among the services. Further, justice should not

merely be done, but should appear to be done. The following measures are recommended in this connection :

- (i) There should be no delay in the disposal of representations; a time-limit should be laid down during which the representations should be disposed of at all levels;
 - (ii) Whatever is due to a man should be given as early as possible; and
 - (iii) The Railway Minister, Members of the Railway Board, General Managers and Heads of Departments should set apart some time to give a hearing to persons who might like to represent their cases and to draw attention to matters which might not otherwise reach them.
- (b) A proper scheme should be chalked out for educating the employees in matters of discipline through lectures and by publishing literature on the subject in regional languages. The stress should be more on creating a frame of mind that will, voluntarily follow the recognised rules of conduct than on enforcing such rules by creating a fear-complex.
- (c) The disciplinary procedure prescribed should be simplified to ensure that the disciplinary action is taken promptly against the culprit. Definite time-limit should be laid down for the various steps to be followed in regard to the procedure of departmental enquiries and these should be rigidly adhered to.
- (d) There is a great necessity for cordial relations between the executive and the staff on the Railway which employ the largest force under one management. This can be achieved by a proper appreciation of human values, by mutual understanding and closer contacts. The Railway Officers on tour should contact all the staff desirous of meeting them, study their problems and grievances in a sympathetic manner and guide them as to what is reasonable and what is unreasonable in their demands. The Railway Employees' Unions can help in improving discipline by bringing well-authenticated grievances, after a careful check, to the notice of the administration for early action.

(6) Welfare

Officers and supervisory staff in charge of personnel work should be given training in social welfare, industrial psychology and allied subjects.

(7) Other Allied Matters

- (a) The drive which was initiated by the Railway Board for the expeditious settlement of dues of retired employees and liquidating old cases should be further intensified with a view to ensuring that all the old cases are quickly liquidated. Proper machinery should

be set up on all the Railways to see that such abnormal delays in payments do not occur in future. A reasonable and practicable limit for the settlement of the dues should be fixed and rigidly adhered to.

- (b) The Railway Board may consider whether there is any substance in the grievance expressed in several quarters that certain areas do not find adequate representation in the Office of the Railway Board, and if it is so, the Board may also consider as to how this can be rectified without endangering the principle of merit. The feasibility of taking staff for the lower categories in the Board's Office from the individual Railways instead by direct recruitment may be examined.

ESTIMATES COMMITTEE, 25th Report (Ministry of Railways-Passenger Amenities). *New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1956, vi, 77p.*

The Report contains a number of recommendations for improving the quality and content of passenger amenities and for their provision on a systematic and organised basis.

The main recommendations of administrative interest are as follows :

- (a) Amenities provided by the Railways to their passengers are of vital importance in the scheme of national development and education. The facilities and the treatment afforded by the Railways to the third class passengers should be taken as a rough index of the progress of the country towards the Socialist Pattern of Society. The creation of the post of a Deputy General Manager (Amenities) on each Railway should be welcomed. In order to give this officer full-time work he may be entrusted with some of the following items of work : (1) complaints; (2) public relations; (3) publicity; (4) staff welfare; and (5) consultative committees. He should keep close co-ordination with the Divisional/District authorities and watch the progress to ensure that the programme of amenities is carried out in time.
- (b) The Railways have already taken a number of measures to improve the travel conditions of third class passengers. There is considerable scope for expanding these facilities with a view to relieving the present state of overcrowding. Each Railway should compile and publish a gazetteer, which should contain all the relevant information about each station on the particular Railway. This information should also indicate the additional amenities proposed to be provided at each station during the Second Five Year Plan.
- (c) Top priority should be given to the question of providing basic amenities at small stations and that a definite programme should be chalked out to ensure that the provision of these basic amenities is completed during the next three years. A classification of

stations for purposes of passenger amenities similar to the one proposed by the North-Eastern Railway should be evolved in all Railways. In the programme of expenditure to be chalked out, after providing the basic amenities at all the stations, preference should be given to stations in the order of their classification.

- (d) While the efforts made by the Railway Ministry to associate the representatives of the people in the matter of provision of amenities are commendable, the task allotted to the Zonal Passenger Amenities Committee is too heavy. There is considerable scope for decentralisation here. There should be a Regional/Divisional Passenger Amenities Committee for each Region/Division and it is this body, which should indicate the priority to be allotted in providing passenger amenities at stations within that Region/Division.
- (e) The arrangement of having separate telephonic and verbal enquiry counters as in the Western Railway should be extended to all other Railways. Suitable steps should be taken to keep the enquiry offices posted up-to-date in order to disseminate correct information to the public. The Passenger Guides should be provided with a table and a chair which should be kept at a convenient place in the Passenger Hall and a suitable legend "Passenger Guide" indicated prominently on the table. The employees selected for this post should have a special aptitude for this type of work and they should be recruited from amongst people with training in social services.
- (f) (i) Departmental catering on the Southern and the Eastern Railways has been running at a loss, though losses on the Southern Railway are on the decline. Only one station has been chosen on the North-Eastern Railway for introduction of such catering. A few more stations on this Railway should be chosen for the purpose. Wherever possible departmental catering should be introduced and the big contracts should be broken up. Departmental catering on the Railways should be run on a "no profit and no loss" basis on the lines recommended by the Alagesa Committee. The Railway Administration should keep a very close watch and exercise effective supervision over the departmental catering centres.
- (ii) The Indian Railway Delegation to the Soviet and other European Railways suggested that a catering company composed of the Railways and private enterprise with the former having a controlling interest should be formed. They also recommended that such a catering company may be tried in the first instance in a limited area. This experiment should be given a trial in one or two Divisions.

Book Reviews

RESEARCH FRONTIERS IN POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
—Brookings Lectures 1955 ; By STEPHEN K. BAILEY, etc. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1955. vii, 240p. \$2.75.

The volume under notice is the second one in the series of lectures inaugurated at the Brookings Institution in 1954 to promote research in the social sciences. The first volume 'Economics and Public Policy' examined the relations of economics to questions of public policy. The present one discusses trends in recent research in different aspects of politics and government. Thus Stephen K. Bailey discusses, in the first lecture, new research frontiers of interest to legislators and administrators. Herbert A. Simon and Robert A. Dahl follow with an analysis of recent advances in organisation theory in its relation to federal government, and the place of hierarchy, democracy and bargaining in politics and economics. The relevance of the game theory to the analysis of political strategy is the subject-matter of Richard C. Snyder's lecture. Alfred de Grazia and Malcolm Moos next examine the results of recent research on voters and elections in general, on the one hand, and the nominating process on the other. The party system is the subject-matter of a lecture by Paul T. David. The last topic is a more general one, like the first, than the others, and David B. Truman here gives an account of the impact on political science of what he calls the recent revolution in the behavioural sciences.

Graham Wallas, early in this century, once remarked how the former interest among political thinkers in political institutions had diminished in the course of time because the institutions they had analysed had been in terms of a simple and narrow view of human nature, and how, therefore, a more correct view of the latter, especially in the light of psychology, was first called for. Wallas himself did, undoubtedly, analyse institutions too later; but the major effect of his writings, as of many others like him, was to influence the analysis of 'human nature in politics' in terms of the psychology, the irrational psychology of individuals as the more important work to be done. David B. Truman refers to this controversy in his lecture, though from his own point of view one significance of these lectures appears to be the way in which the balance is being restored among political scientists, in favour of the importance of the institutional approach, though indeed based on the most recent psychological advances.

As one read through the illuminating, even exhilarating, pages of this volume one was also reminded how, at least in India, so much of political science teaching in the Universities is behind current research. Reliance is almost wholly on textbooks, and very few of these in use have availed themselves of the results of research published in periodicals even at the time of their writings. Unless textbooks use this material in their preparation, and are supplemented by the results of more recent research in scientific journals of politics and allied sciences, the teaching and learning are bound to be unsatisfactory. Burke once remarked that most men are fifty years behind in their politics; it is almost equally true of most textbook writers and teachers of political science.

—V.K.N. Menon

PRIVATE MEMBERS' BILLS IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT;

By P.A. BROMHEAD, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956. xi, 216p. 25s.

So pre-occupied is the British Parliament with the disposal of Government Bills and other Government business that legislative proposals sponsored by private members receive a raw deal. In the volume under review, Mr. P.A. Bromhead makes a historical and analytical examination of the constitutional status of the private member, his rights of sponsoring legislation *vis-a-vis* the Government, the conditions under which they can be exercised and the subjects on which he may conveniently sponsor legislation. Mr. Bromhead is willing to tilt a lance in defence of the cause, but is constrained to the conclusion that the right of the private member, though theoretically justifiable and indisputable, is irreconcilable with the Executive's demand for Parliament's time and attention for getting through urgent public business. His analysis indicates, what is evident to every student of parliamentary procedure and parliament's work, that the private members' Bills are fast becoming, if they have not already become, an anachronism and that the time spent on their consideration constitutes an incursion into Parliament's time which can more advantageously be devoted to government business. The private member's enthusiasm for winning legislative spurs by bringing up his own Bills can, Mr. Bromhead shows, be profitably and effectively expended in participating in debates on Government's Bills and other measures and in moulding them along the right lines.

In countries with a parliamentary system after the British model and with a well developed party system, this deterioration in attention devoted by the legislature to business brought forward by the private member has inevitably supervened, as recent developments in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and India amply demonstrate. The Standing Orders and the Rules of Procedure of the Indian Parliament, for example, provide for discussion of private members' Bills and resolutions. Half a day on the Friday of every week when Parliament is sitting, is appropriated for that purpose. While every attempt is made to keep the allocation intact and private members sponsoring Bills zealously defend their rights in that regard, the time allotted to the consideration of such business is hardly adequate to facilitate anything like exhaustive or illuminative debates on the issues raised. Resolutions after a perfunctory debate are precipitately put to the vote, while Bills which cannot in any event concern matters involving encroachment into the sphere of the Executive's responsibility for policy or administration, except in rare cases, are hardly able to negotiate their passage into the Statute Book. If in a Parliament's whole lifetime one or two such Bills successfully reach their destination, it would be a feather in their sponsors' caps. The one private member's Bill of any significance that has successfully performed this arduous journey in the life of the present Parliament in India is that sponsored by Mr. Feroze Gandhi for protecting newspapers' reporting of parliamentary proceedings. A decidedly supporting factor in this case, which is true generally of all similar cases, was the Government's acceptance of the principle of the proposed measure.

Mr. Bromhead feels that subjects susceptible of being well handled through private members' Bills are those "with which the political parties as such are not concerned". These would generally include measures for the social and moral amelioration of the people, such as control of alcoholic

liquor, matters relating to social behaviour in which sections of public opinion hold strong convictions, imposition of restrictions on the press and cinema in the interest of public morality, protection of wild game and prevention of cruelty to animals, etc. Even in such matters the State's responsibility for regulation and control is increasingly being recognised, resulting in a corresponding limitation of the area of private members' initiative. Nevertheless, where initiative is forthcoming, even if the Bill is not finally adopted, the opportunity afforded by even the inconclusive debates thereon and ventilation of diverse points of view which would otherwise have no occasion to be heard on the floor of Parliament and the educative value they inhere, is a factor which justifies the time spent on them. It might pave the way for an official Bill on the same matter subsequently.

The basic issue involved is, therefore, this, whether the severe restrictions on private members' Bills that become imperative in the inexorable circumstances under which Parliament functions vitiate the democratic principle? Here the experience of those countries which have adopted the British system indicates that "in the conditions of the modern world, governmental responsibility is so all-embracing that it is really not suitable for individual members to propose Bills at all". In so far as he endeavours to plough a lonely furrow, the private member's position in this respect is as invidious as that of the independent or unattached member. On the other side is, however, the pertinent consideration mentioned by Mr. Bromhead that "the continued provision of opportunities for the introduction of private members' Bills and the debates on these bills without the normal operation of party discipline, provides a valuable counter-weight to the increase of Government's authority on all normal occasions. It does much to preserve the variety and types of activity which is so good for the vitality of Parliament."

Mr. Bromhead has made an interesting and informative survey of a somewhat unusual and scarcely discussed aspect of the functioning of parliamentary system, and though it does not yield encouraging results from the standpoint of the private member, it reveals how an apparently undemocratic development is really an inescapable concomitant of the British parliamentary system and of similar systems elsewhere.

—C.V.H. Rao

TREASURY CONTROL—The Co-ordination of Financial and Economic Policy in Great Britain; By SAMUEL H. BEER, *London, Oxford University Press, 1956. vii, 138p., 15s.*

In this valuable addition to the extremely limited literature on the subject, Prof. Beer of Harvard University gives an exhaustive and revealing analysis of the role of the British Treasury as the principal co-ordinator of the financial and economic policies of the government and explains how the choice of the co-ordinating agency and the pattern and methods of co-ordination have largely been determined by the stage of political, economic and organizational development. The present nature and form of Treasury control, we are told, is a logical product of 'Cabinet democracy' and 'Civil Service democracy' and is a major safeguard against the misuse of wide powers left to the executive—much wider than those enjoyed by the American

executive. In other words, it provides "a complement or balance on the administrative plane to the powerful position of the executive under the Cabinet government."

The British Treasury—the Department of Departments—enjoys enormous powers. This great power is, in Prof. Beer's opinion, in the nature of power of *influence* rather than power of *command* or direction. Though the Treasury can withhold sanction of funds or approval of new proposals, but this control is essentially negative—it is just the application of government policy to decide what a Department *may* do. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has the exclusive responsibility for finding money to meet government expenditure, but he cannot, being himself a part of the plural chief executive, direct another minister. There is, accordingly, a natural tendency to agreement at both the ministerial and secretariat levels, and the final official decisions result from a balance of pressures on which the Treasury has exerted no more force than any other Department. However, due to the unique position occupied by the Chancellor in the Cabinet, "the tendency to agreement produces not simply compromise but decisions shaped around the Treasury view." The Treasury power is further reinforced by the high professional standards of the Civil Service, tradition and history, and the representation granted to it on various committees. On the whole, the author implicitly agrees, but expressly denies, that the ultimate source of Treasury power is its authority to withhold sanction of funds.

As the chief co-ordinator of financial policy the function of the Treasury is two-fold: to seek balance in programmes of expenditure in accordance with the priorities set by government policies; and to prevent extravagance and enforce economy. These objectives are realized through an elaborate procedure of meticulous financial control—the requirement of prior approval, criticism of new legislation or policy, annual review of estimates, transfer of appropriated funds between sub-heads, sanction of supplementary grants, etc. Recently there has been a manifest trend towards greater delegation to departments upon whom has always rested the final responsibility for good financial administration. The role of the Treasury is increasingly becoming one of standard-setting and ensuring that standards of prudent house-keeping are observed.

According to the author, the British system of financial approval and review has two distinct advantages over its American counterpart. Firstly, it has the necessary flexibility to allow the executive to correct normal discrepancies in the estimation of expenditure and thus to effect economies. Secondly, it enables the executive to incur liabilities in anticipation of parliamentary appropriations, even in the absence of a statute embodying financial sanctions. Thus, "the British executive has a wider freedom of manoeuvre which may greatly facilitate making of policy and new programmes."

In the realm of economic policy, though the Treasury does not exercise that complete control which it has traditionally enjoyed over financial matters, it has come to assume wider responsibilities here too, especially after 1947. The emergence of the Treasury as the centre for economic planning and co-ordination has come about after a long and varied experience with other co-ordinating devices (such as the Lord President's Co-ordinating

Committee for Home Affairs, the general system of inter-departmental committees, and the committee of the permanent heads of the main economic departments) and in response to the need for a clear and consistent, overall economic policy. Being concerned with home and foreign finance and establishment matters and having a regular contact with all other departments, the Treasury has naturally tended to become the focal point for co-ordinating economic policies. But the more important reason for it perhaps lies in the existing nature of economic planning and administrative decision-making. The co-ordination of economic policy involves a continual balancing of numerous forces. Economic policy is not static; it is being made and altered from time to time. Factors other than economic have also to be taken into account. The administrator today can hardly expect to achieve economic rationality, nor can he afford to wait for it. He lives in a world of reality; he must therefore assess *all* probabilities and come to a quick decision. The application of econometrics to planning may lead to greater economic rationality but that would require centralisation of authority to the extent which would be self-defeating. Prof. Beer feels that in the context of the current British economic philosophy and the present stage of economic planning, the Treasury is the best-equipped agency to co-ordinate economic policy. The present method and manner of co-ordination will, however, not be suitable for "quantitative" planning which would greatly reduce the importance of finance.

The methods of economic co-ordination are not as settled as in the case of financial policy, and vary with time and circumstance. The style of co-ordination is nonetheless broadly similar. The initiative here also lies with the Departments; the Treasury only tries to guide and instruct the initiative on the right lines by relating the details of a particular negotiation to the wider context of government policies.

Prof. Beer's conclusions would be of special interest to those who would like to see dilution of the traditional influence of Finance to allow greater financial freedom to individual departments and agencies. Unless a high degree of financial competence and integrity is developed within each Department, there is a great danger that, in under-developed countries, such financial delegation may lead to frittering away of funds badly needed for development. That does not, however, obviate the necessity of reforming the present methods and procedures of financial approval and control in order to meet the requirements of development plans. Though Prof. Beer does not directly deal with this basic question, he rightly observes that ultimately "a certain balance needs to be found between an excessive departmentalism which impairs the coherence of decisions and an excessive centralisation which hampers execution."

—B. S. Narula